The Christian faith has historically been understood as grounded in historical figures and events upon which the individual is called to learn, contemplate and believe. Although Christianity indeed offers the contemporary pilgrim much in the way of universal and transhistorical truth, it is quickly realized that even these have come to us in the swaddling clothes of history. Recent historiography en toto has increasingly tended toward relativism due to a growing awareness of the role of what Carl Becker has termed "climates of opinion" or Thomas Kuhn the now iconic "paradigm". Modern definitions of the task of historiography have experienced a dramatic shift from "purely scientific 1 " to "ultimately aesthetic and moral" 2. This shift inevitably impacts anyone attempting to put forth a reconstruction of past events, ideas, or interpretation of texts, all of which fall squarely within the spheres of biblical and theological studies. This essay will present first an overview of recent trends within historiography and then an alternative approach to historiography will be offered through which the following corollaries are defensible: (a) the credibility of Christianity's fundamental reliance upon historical figures and events as a basis of faith, proclamation, and scholarship; (b) the possibility of access, investigation, and verification of these same historical figures and events by non-Christian scholars; (c) the use of valid historical-critical methodologies with the expectation of ascertaining historical accuracy; and (d) recognition and integration of recent theories emphasizing the pervasive influence of the observer upon the object. It is my conviction that these corollaries must be defended if evangelical Christian faith and scholarship intend to in any way engage modern academia with the same claims they have traditionally espoused.
A very general overview 3 of historiographical trends reveals three approaches which have each become prominent in the field at one point or another: the ideological, scientific, and relativistic. The first, ideological or presuppositional historiography is the predominant approach employed by pre-Enlightenment histories and several traditions thereafter. Ideological history starts with an historian who has already taken an interpretive stance of the events and thus goes about writing history in order to defend that position. Ancient examples of this would include the histories of Eusebius, Orosius, Josephus, and the Gospel of John, the latter of which explains, "These things have been written so that you may believe that Jesus in the Christ" (20:31). More modern examples would include any number of histories written from a primarily "whig", Marxist, capitalistic, nationalistic or religious view of history 4. As a method, the ideological approach proves to be a very powerful polemic tool for the historian's cause through its use of historical facts as a demonstration of the truth of a particular position. But this approach has also proved to induce skepticism as to the accuracy or honesty employed by the historian. Implementation of an ideological method does not exclude the possibility of historical accuracy, but does imply at the very least a high degree of selectivity and interpretation on the part of the historian. A crescendo of such skepticism has resulted in the recent swing toward complete relativization of historical knowledge, a trend to which we shall soon turn.
The second major approach to history is found in scientific historiography , which seeks to implement historiographical procedures modeled after those of the natural sciences. Traditionally, this approach has adamantly opposed any hint of ideological influence, but has instead insisted on a "presuppositionless" or "selfless" investigation of the historical facts. Following in the footsteps of empiricism, scientific historiography will see as true only those interpretations of historical facts which are most verifiable or reasonable. On the one hand, this method has engendered much gain in historical studies through its optimism that actual knowledge of particular facts is possible. On the other hand, strict adherence to this model has proven an obstacle to evangelical historians due to the former's near a priori denial of the possibility of the miraculous 5 . Further difficulty arises from the fact that it becomes increasingly clear not all reasonable assertions, beliefs or experiences are verifiable to the degree insisted upon here 6 .
Scrutiny of scientific historiography has discovered it to be an unrealized ideal despite the valiant attempts of many. The possibility of a "presuppositionless" anything has fallen into more than doubt while greater and greater influence is attributed to one's own world view. Objective reconstruction of the past is denied by such thinkers as Carl Becker who has concluded that any history is "an imaginative creation, a personal possession which each one of us... fashions out of his individual experience, adapts to his practical or emotional needs, and adorns as well as may be to suite his aesthetic tastes." 7Even the once seemingly impenetrable bastion of scientific procedure has fallen into question with Thomas Kuhn's landmark analysis of the history of the sciences 8 .
All of this marks the snowballing transition toward the third major approach we will consider, relativistic historiography , which views all attempts at history as inevitably a reconstruction of the past into what the historian thought or wished had happened. The relativistic differs from ideological historiography in that the former views the historian as inescapably locked into a particular worldview or paradigm. Ideological historians write history from a vantage point they have predetermined, while relativistic historiography views the very ability of the historian as determined by contextual factors such as culture, education, gender, race, and religion. As an interpretive theory, relativistic historiography does indeed provide accurate insight into a great number of written histories. As a method, however, relativism carries with it what I personally deem unwanted baggage. First, the focal point of the task has shifted from what happened and what was written to why the historian wrote what he did. Issues of motivation and occasion are not the sole property of relativism, of course, but content has also generally been viewed as the crux of meaning and investigation 9. The shift away from content underscores a more fundamental problem inherent in the relativistic approach, the implicit denial of the possibility of any objective knowledge. Moderate relativists tend to deny or minimize this problem by pointing to the descriptive value of a relativistic framework. But relativism itself quickly moves from description to prescription and insists that every observer is a prisoner of one of many relative paradigms among which correspondence is at best unlikely 10. This utterly removes the possibility and relevance of factuality from the spheres of history and knowledge, leaving only autobiographical interpretation and solipsism. For some this may be a comfortable and non-demanding position to find oneself, but for many, it marks a serious degeneration of human knowledge 11. For evangelical scholarship, it denies a most fundamental necessity, historical knowledge as the basis of one faith. If biblical historians such as Luke or John 12are subjected to this model, immediately lost is the ability to claim both that the text speaks one thing, and that this one thing corresponds to a universally accessible reality.
It is evident from this brief discussion of the three prominent historiographical approaches that they comprise a spectrum rather than three distinct views. The variables in this spectrum are two: the roles of observation and presupposition. One the one end we find scientific historiography elevating observation to its highest possible position, while simultaneously diminishing as detrimental the role of presupposition. On the other end we see relativistic historiography attributing knowledge solely to the role of presupposition while finding no place for observation. Ideological historiography represents one possible mediary position wherein presuppositions are held while observation takes place, but in this case the polemic intention of the historian is attributed primary influence. If indeed this spectrum analogy is accurate 13, it becomes immediately clear that the primary two-fold question facing the development of any historiography is: What shall be done with presupposition and observation? An attempt will be made here to deal with only the first of these two and propose a theory of presupposition which coherently recognizes both the need for factual input and the observation that presupposition inevitably plays a role in any theory of knowledge. To this task we now turn.
Once we choose to step back from empirical and relativistic claims as standard bearer, we find that we are also free from their inherent disdain of and determinism by presuppositions. The role of presuppositions may now freely be evaluated in relation to knowledge, leaving open the possibility of both negative and positive influences. Regarding the relation of observation and presupposition, the work of Adolf Schlatter has proven quite insightful. Much of Schlatter's own methodology hinges on his understanding of the relationship between observation and judgment . Observation entails the historian's honest interaction with the object in an attempt to achieve what he terms "genuine seeing" 14 . Such genuine seeing is the initial historical task and "is not concerned with the interests that emerge from the course of our own life, but directs its attentions quite deliberately away from ourselves and our own contemporary interests, back to the past. Our own convictions, which determine our thought and will, are held at a distance. We keep them out of the investigation so that we can see the subject matter as it was. Its effect on us and the way in which it might tie in with our own thinking and willing is not at this point brought into the field of our observation." 15
Lest we think Schlatter and scientific historians such as Wrede essentially agree on this point, we must consider certain qualifications proposed by Schlatter. First, perfect knowledge of our subject is unattainable due to its location in the past 16. Second, the question of truth is at best only partially answered by this historical task, for there still remains the aspect of "effective reality" 17, that is, discerning what the truth of the past has to do with us today. Thirdly, and for our purposes most importantly, Schlatter strongly emphasizes the inability of the historian to completely remove personal judgments from the observation process. He writes, "It is clear that without the honest attempt to lay aside all personal concerns and the opinions of one's school or party, and seriously to see , academic work degenerates into hypocrisy. But even this honest attempt cannot overcome the fact that an observer sees with his own eyes only what the certainties that internally determine him allow him to perceive." 18This third qualification then ushers in the question of the relation between observation and such "certainties", that is, between the pursuit of accurate knowledge and the presence of presupposition. For one the one hand, we are told that success in the historical task, and subsequently the interpretive task depends upon a genuine seeing of what was, while on the other we are told that observation is determined by presupposition.
Schlatter's keen insight into these matters brings us amazingly close to the contemporary discussion. Kuhn has pointed out essentially the same relation between observation, discovery and the "paradigm" 19within which the researcher finds himself. Although Kuhn, like Schlatter, does not deny the validity of scientific knowledge, his thesis has nonetheless been championed by relativists. Schlatter's own statement of "certainties that internally determine" presents the same potential for misunderstanding if we fail to distinguish the precise role of presuppositions in this process.
We must first distinguish between what we will here term observation, judgment and presupposition. Schlatter's definition of the task of observation can readily be adopted. It is that engagement by the researcher of an object, without reference to personal views or expectation. We may also qualify this by stating that the researcher is not able to remove from his observation all hint of judgment and belief, if for no other reason than the presence of a functional memory. This need not imply, however, that the content of the observations themselves are in any way determined at the offset by the presence of judgments or presuppositions. We can still allow for an actual correspondence between object and idea. 20
The relation of two or more observations (past or present) results in the necessity of an exercise of judgment . We commonly understand such judgments of relation as constituting a theory . Theories exist continually within the mind either consciously or otherwise, since interaction and multiplication of observations is a process we are continuously involved in throughout the duration of our life. Thus, a researcher approaching an object finds it as undetermined content, but then immediately determines for himself the relationship of that observation to the ever expanding network of previous observations. 21The question then arises how one chooses a theory. Is a purely an arbitrary affair? Or is the choice of a theory itself determined?
This brings us to the role of presuppositions or my term of choice, meta-view. It is clear that the total possible number of theories exceeds those implemented by the observer. Some he flatly rejects, some he puts on the back burner, and some he habitually implements. Thus a selection of theories has taken place according to some set of criteria. The grid through which a theory is run in order to ascertain its acceptability is that of the meta-view . Nicolas Wolterstorff understands this meta-view to be comprised of what he terms "Control-beliefs" 22 . Such control-beliefs do not simply stand above the observer determining what he or she may think or suppose; viz., they are not to be understood as controlling-beliefs . They are interactive with phenomena and may indeed be informed by observation, experience, and logic. They also may contain a priori beliefs and beliefs derived from special revelation. Together, these control-beliefs comprise a meta-view through which the individual interprets the world and its meaning.
The meta-view functions on three levels. On one level, it serves to inform the individual as to the very nature of meta-view itself. This is to say that the meta-view contains some basic beliefs about itself. Wolterstorff terms these as data-background beliefs . This is not to say that the meta-view determines itself, but rather that once particular data-background beliefs are adopted the individual is committed to only those meta-views which are compatible with those beliefs. It remains possible for the individual to exchange these data-background beliefs with others, thus allowing for a shift in meta-views. Data-background beliefs may be derived from the entire gambit of sources listed above, and once adopted serve to inform the individual as to how further beliefs are to be received. On a second level, the meta-view contains beliefs which inform the individual as to what patterns are consistent with the meta-view. For example, prior to making any judgment regarding a theory on the origin of my PC, I first require some basic beliefs about computers and production. Wolterstorff terms these data-beliefs , since much of their content is actually data which the individual has gathered along the way. Any acceptable PC-origination theory would then necessarily comport with these data-beliefs. On a third level, the meta-view operates through control-beliefs. These control-beliefs are beliefs as to what types of theories are consistent with the data-background and data beliefs in place. Control-beliefs may be viewed as practical implications of the basic meta-view. Thus a researcher with meta-view A may need to scrap theory Z, not due to a determination on the part of the meta-view, but due to the theory's lack of coherence or compellingness in relation to the meta-view complex. It is crucial to note here that at no level of the meta-view is interaction with and informing by the physical realm made impossible. In fact, many of the beliefs involved derive primarily from interaction with the world. Thus scholarship contributes to the meta-view, and one meta-view can learn from another meta-view. This stands in contrast with the claim of relativism, a claim which ultimately undermines all academic endeavour and knowledge.
This essay has briefly outlined the empirical, ideological, and relativistic approaches to historiography. In response to inadequacies within these, a coherent theory of presuppositions has been put forth which abandons neither scientific knowledge nor the positive role of presuppositions. The theory proposed allows for the possibility of all the aims outlined in the introduction of this essay and which I believe are necessary for evangelical scholarship to exists. We find that belief in past events and people remains plausible and defensible since the possibility of knowledge per se continues to exists. 23Christian and non-Christian scholars alike have access to the historical data of Christian history. The difference between these two groups lies not in their access, but in their theorizing and structuring of that data into their respective meta-views. Scientific methodologies such as the historical-critical remain a viable tool of scholarship for the Christian, even in matters pertaining to revelation. Particular methodologies, just as any other theory, will be subject to acceptance or rejection according to the criteria of the meta-view. The cry of relativism can be recognized as valid, although with the understanding that different perspectives arising from similar phenomena can be attributed to the presence of various meta-views and supporting beliefs, and does not relativize knowledge per se; logic, e.g., remains universal. The essay has left open the important and necessary epistemological question. We have concluded the discussion of presuppositions prematurely content with the possibility of objective knowledge while at the same time assuming its role in presupposition formation. A complete epistemology remains necessary in order for this proposal to be complete.
Noll, Mark. "Scientific History in America: A centennial observation from a Christian point of view". Fides et Historia . 14:1 (1981-82), 21-37.
Novick, Peter. That Noble Dream: The "objectivity question" and the American historical profession . (London: Cambridge; 1988)
Schlatter, Adolf. "Adolf Schlatter on Method in New Testament Theology". Appendix C of Neuer, Werner. Adolf Schlatter: A biography of Germany's premier biblical theologian . (Grand Rapids: Baker Books; 1995). Robert Yarbrough, trans.
Wolterstorff, Nicolas. Reason within the Bounds of Religion . (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; (1976)
Wrede, Wilhelm. "The Task and Methods of New Testament Theology". Chapter in Morgan, Robert. ed.. The Nature of New Testament Theology . (London: SCM Press; 1973)
| 1 | For example, this is the thesis of Wilhelm Wrede's landmark monograph "The Task and Methods of 'New Testament Theology'" the translation of which appears in Robert Morgan, ed., The Nature of New Testament Theology . (London: SCM Press, 1973), 68-116. |
| 2 | "The best grounds for choosing one perspective on history rather than another are ultimately aesthetic and moral rather than epistemological." Hayden White, Metahistory (Baltimore, 1973), xii. Quoted in Peter Novick's That Noble Dream: The objectivity question and the American historical profession. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988), 601 n.34. |
| 3 | For a thorough examination of the ideological developments within modern historiography, see especially Georg G. Iggers, "Historicism: The History and Meaning of the Term", Journal of the History of Ideas (1995), 129-152. |
| 4 | See Novick, That Noble Dream , 206ff. for a detailed treatment of modern ideological histories. |
| 5 | This necessity follows very clearly from an enlightenment understanding of the uniformity of natural law and sequence. David Hume argues, "There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit the appellation. And as a uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle." An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding . LaSalle, ed. 1956. |
| 6 | For example, the claim that all claims to truth are necessarily verifiable and reasonable is itself unverifiable. |
| 7 | Carl Becker, "Everyman His Own Historian," American Historical Review , (1932) 37:221-36. Quoted in Mark Noll, "Scientific History in America". Fides et Historia , (1981-82) 14:1, 24. |
| 8 | Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions . (Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press, 1962) |
| 9 | This statement is put forth with caution, recognizing the claim of scientific historians such as Wrede that "we can no longer pose questions simply in the light of the literary material. We must pose them as far as possible in view of the subject matter, the historical situation." Task , 98. |
| 10 | A more extreme position is found in Hayden White who claimed that the work of each historian constituted an "effectively closed system of thought, incommensurable with all the others appearing in contention with it." Quoted in Novick, 602. |
| 11 | Although predating this immediate context, it was in the increasing recognition of the role of historical conditioning in ideas and values that Ernst Troeltsch spoke of the "Crisis of Historicism", a crisis he attempted to resolve in The Absolute Truth of Christianity (1902). |
| 12 | Although both of these writers clearly are simultaneously theologians and historians, this simple fact does not impair the possibility that each have presented accurate histories. |
| 13 | Though undoubtedly simplistic. |
| 14 | Schlatter views this seeing as requiring of the historian "the selfless act of genuine seeing [through which] our heightened individual life is augmented by coming to a full, effective relationship with the reality outside and above itself. Our thinking and willing thus become a part of the wider human community." Schlatter , 179 |
| 15 | Schlatter , 170 |
| 16 | An interesting discussion arises from this point, revolving around the inevitable presence of forgetfulness wherever memory is to be found, and the necessary distinction in the mind between past events and the present. |
| 17 | Schlatter understands this to be "the question of truth [in] its full significance" Schlatter , 171. And it is upon the dogmatician rather than the historian that this question falls, understanding, of course, that these two roles are both phases of the same task. |
| 18 | Schlatter , 174 |
| 19 | Kuhn defines paradigm as something "like an accepted judicial decision in the common law, it is an object for further articulation and specification under new or more stringent conditions". The Structure of Scientific Revolutions , 23. It is perhaps of worth to point out that vital to Kuhn's thesis is the necessity to define a paradigm in such a way that it is not viewed as being informed by scientific inquiry and experimentation, but instead is simply "articulated" and "specified" by such. Once paradigms fall under scientific verification, his notion of the revolutionary nature of a paradigm-shift is weakened. |
| 20 | Although I do not justify this allowance in this essay, I nevertheless understand this correspondence to be crucial to the fields of history in general, and biblical studies specifically. |
| 21 | We may also here admit Kuhn's thesis that the observer's approach to and questions raised regarding an object are often derived from theories already in the observer's mind and expectation. This in no way prohibits transtheoretical questions and observations from taking place. Indeed, the skilled researcher will anticipate this tendency rather than unconsciously follow it. This point is made by Schlatter, Kuhn and Nicholas Wolterstorff. |
| 22 | Dr. Wolterstorff's discussion of such beliefs is found in his Reason within the bounds of Religion. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1976) |
| 23 | The general question of reliability of particular witnesses is not here addressed. |