On Kant's Notion of Moral Autonomy

This paper will examine Kant's understanding of the relation among morality, autonomy and rationality with the two-fold aim of offering both critique of and alternative to Kant's epistemological presuppositions and conclusions. It will be argued that Kant's pivotal notions of a cognitively inaccessible noumenal world about which we may only posit that we are members qua intelligence (and thereby autonomous), and that this noumenal realm exists exclusively and innately within the rational subject (thereby making the subject moral "lawmaker") are intuitively unwarranted and arguably false. It will also be argued that pure reason and moral law derive their universality from their objective and transcendent reality within and above the individual. This paper will not address the question of the moral law's content nor will it attempt to offer a theory of how the moral law motivates conformity.

Overview

Kant views the rational being as simultaneously citizen of two worlds, one sensate and the other noumenal. The sensate world is comprised of the physical universe in all its array of phenomena, laws and influences. The rational being not only finds himself located within this world, but also a participant in its vast and complex causality. The sensate world is governed by natural laws whose authority is grounded in their utter conformity efficient causes. All movement and influence within this world takes place only in strict obedience to these natural laws. Despite rational capabilities, most, if not all of the actions of rational beings are also played out in accordance with these laws. The sight of the eye is achieved only through the intricate adherence to natural laws. So also the ears' ability to perceive sonic waves. The rational being's entire participation in the world of sights, sounds, tastes, textures and smells is enacted through empirical senses operating solely in accordance with laws of nature ¹. Even the deeper "matters of the heart" do not escape the authority of the causal law. Emotions of love, joy, hate, even one's moral sense or conscience can be shown to derive solely from empirical factors ². When man views himself as a citizen of the sensate world, then, he sees himself as operating within the series of efficient causes.

But the rational being also seems to have the capacity for self-determinism. This capacity is derived solely from his rationality. Reason allows the rational being to break free of the series of efficient causes which otherwise reign over everything within the sensate world. Rather than being determined by natural laws, reason provides the ability for the rational being to choose his actions. To answer the question of how this is possible, Kant posits the existence of the noumenal world, believing that the Idea of the noumenal world is necessary if the rational being is to claim for himself freedom from being determined by efficient causes. ³

The ability of the noumenal world to free us from efficient causality lies in its abstract nature as pure reason. It would seem to Kant that the only commonality between these two very diverse worlds in the existence of the rational agent. ⁴By his participation in this abstract world, the rational agent inherits an other-worldliness which in this sensate realm translates into free will. ⁵The characteristic of all citizens of the noumenal world, therefore, is a freedom from the efficient causal series of the physical universe.

The human ability to accumulate knowledge operates solely only under empirical methods, which results in the consequence that we know things only as they interact or influence us. In other words, human knowledge is only capable of a knowledge of appearances , never knowledge of a thing in itself. ⁶ This, claims Kant, greatly restricts our ability to gain any knowledge of the noumenal, since in is by definition abstracted entirely from the empirical realm. In fact, all we may know of the noumenal world is that we are citizens of it and that somehow its laws are morally normative for us. ⁷But as scanty as this understanding is, it nevertheless accounts for rational beings' utterly unique situation in the sensate world, namely, that although existing to a great degree within the natural series of efficient causes, humans may nonetheless act as agents of free will.

But a natural consequence of autonomy is morality. ⁸ Morality, referring to behavioral or attitudinal prescriptions rather than descriptions of occurring phenomena within nature, must therefore arise from outside the sensate world of efficient causes. Kant therefore rejects all other attempts at establishing empirically derived "moralities", including those based on utility, moral sense, eudaemonia and happiness. Instead, Kant understands the morality as being necessarily grounded in an unconditioned moral law. Kant finds such an unconditioned law in the noumenal world. And since it is solely through the noumenal that rational beings derive their freedom from efficient causal determinism, and since morality can only be applied to beings capable of such freedom, it seems quite plausible that morality itself will also stem from this common denominator. Kant conclusion, then, is that only in the noumenal world are we able to locate a universally binding a priori moral determinant.

But what has limited the rational being in knowledge of the noumenal world must also limit his knowledge of the moral law of the noumenal world. In other words, if the noumenal world is by definition abstracted from all efficient causality, and if humanity finds itself utterly dependent upon this causality for both action and knowledge, in what practical way can the noumenal contribute to the human ethical situation? Indeed, the classic criticism of Kant's entire moral project has been that it virtually removes all knowledge of the moral sphere and its laws from the exclusively empirical level of human existence. How can we possibly derive a practical moral norm from a noumenal realm completely abstracted from human knowledge?

Kant's solution to this dilemma is best known as the Categorical Imperative. Although we cannot directly intuit the noumenal world's moral law, we can nevertheless empirically arrive at two ⁹ accurate conclusions about this moral law. First, it will possess universality if it indeed is an unconditioned moral law. ¹⁰ Second, it will possess the nature of a law , that is, it will prescribe rather than describe an action, if indeed it is to fulfill the role of a moral law . ¹¹ By combining these two characteristics into one formula, Kant arrives at his Universal Law Formula: Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law . ¹²In order to find those empirically derived actions which best accord with the abstract moral law, each rational agent must, upon entering the situation in question, ask himself whether he could reasonably ¹³choose his preferred action (i.e., his maxim) to become a law which all rational beings must adhere to. If the answer to this is affirmative, the rational agent is justified in believing his action to be the moral thing to do. In this way, you are able to find those practical norms which best coincide with the abstract norms.

Having thus explained the source of the moral law and the method of its empirical identification, Kant addresses the question of to what end the moral law applies? He concludes that the end of the moral law must also lie outside the sensate world of contingencies and efficient causes. For, it seems impossible that a universal and unconditioned moral law would have as its end a contingent and conditional element of efficient causality. Given this, then, Kant claims that the end of the moral law must be unconditioned and independent of efficient causality, and hence, outside the closed system of the sensate world. Kant concludes that the end of the moral law must be located exclusively in rational beings in general, and humanity specifically. ¹⁴If the rational individual alone suffices to fulfill the definition of the end of the moral law, then each individual will, by reason, recognize that every rational being constitutes that same end, resulting in the conclusion that each individual's moral action must have every individual's (i.e., collectively humanity's) well-being as its end. By adding this consideration to the first formulation, Kant deduces his second formula, the Formula of the End in Itself: Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person on any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end . ¹⁵

From this conclusion also arises Kant's notion of a Kingdom of Ends, in which each moral agent ideally serves as law giver. If each rational being is an end in himself, and if the sole portal through which moral law enters into the sensate world and humanity is the same rational being, and if the sole producer of empirically applicable (i.e., practical) moral laws is that same rational being as he applies the Universal Law Formula to his maxims, then, Kant concludes, we must view that rational being a capable of making moral law. ¹⁶ This conclusion accounts for Kant's third formulation, the Formula of the Kingdom of Ends: Never perform an action except on a maxim such as can also be a universal law, and consequently such that the will can regard itself as at the same time making universal law by means of its maxim . ¹⁷

Response

Although what has been offered here is only a brief and arguably simplistic overview of Kant's moral philosophy, it nevertheless allows for the accurate observation that the heart of Kant's theory is his notion of rational autonomy. From his notion of the autonomous implications of the rational nature, Kant directly or indirectly derives his concepts of the noumenal world, the characteristics of the moral law ¹⁸, humanity as an end it itself, rational being as moral law-giver, and free will. Therefore, a closer examination of Kant's understanding of rational autonomy will prove valuable to a critique of the greater portion of his moral philosophy.

Kant's scheme is as follows. As the rational being acts within the sensate world he is aware of a capacity within himself which seems to allow for self-determination. And yet, since all actions take place within the realm of efficient causes, there is no possible way of determining the actual existence of such a freedom. Although this would seem to point one in the direction of determinism, such a conclusion seems to be counterintuitive. For this reason, Kant concludes that all rational beings must lend themselves to the Idea of freedom as the only explanation of their actions. ¹⁹Once assuming this Idea, the rational being is able to conceive of his will as actually capable of choosing, or as Kant often puts it, capable of practical reason. ²⁰ If this Idea is abandoned or proven to be false ²¹, the only alternative is for the rational agent to admit that his "will" is in actuality being determined by efficient causes. We see, therefore, that the Idea of freedom is derived from the necessity to explain what is empirically perceived by the rational subject as paradoxical. In other words, the Idea of autonomy thus presented is an empirical concept rather than a priori idea.

In similar fashion, we may recall, this sense of paradox led Kant to posit the existence of the noumenal world. The noumenal world also escaped any attempt at definition due to its complete abstraction from the realm of efficient causality. Kant similarly describes the concept of the noumenal world as only a point of view which reason finds itself constrained to adopt in order to conceive itself as practical. ²² We see, therefore, that out of the rational being's empirically derived paradoxical sense of self-determination arises both the notions of noumenal world and autonomy. And thus presented, both of these notions are empirically derived as opposed to a priori ideas. The significance of this fact will become very relevant to this discussion when we realize that the consequence of these two notions is morality itself. ²³

The fact that Kant empirically derives both the abstract notions of the noumenal world and of autonomy accounts for their utter inaccessibility to the human mind. Kant seems to view the characteristic of inaccessibility as evidence of authority. But in fact, the inaccessibility betrays both notions' lack of content. Based on observations within the empirical realm, Kant has concluded the necessity of a completely abstract realm in order to account for the phenomena. It would seem that if Kant were accurate up to this point, the most he could conclude is that the abstract realm accounts for the sense of paradox. And Kant clearly points out that both notions of autonomy and the noumenal world are at best to be understood as mere Ideas under which rational beings account for their sense of self-determinism. Likewise, in both cases, Kant rejects any possibility of demonstrating or proving either the existence or non-existence such notions, due to the fact that they, by definition, exist outside the causal series of the physical universe.

Kant's own attempts to define these notions and their influence upon humanity seem to raise more questions than they answer. For example, he has thus far defined autonomy solely as an independence from determination by causes in the sensate world. ²⁴And this definition accords precisely with our earlier observation, namely, this notion is grounded squarely in the empirical realm. For only in reference to the physical world may rational beings be considered in any sense free. When it comes to relating this concept of freedom to the noumenal realm toward which we are being freed, the best definition we are given is that freedom of the will is to be understood as a causality conforming to the immutable laws of the noumenal realm ²⁵. In other words, by removing myself from the determining causes or natural laws of the sensate world through rationality, I am simply submitting myself to determinism by the causes or immutable laws of the noumenal world. At this point, any truly rational being would ask himself the question: Why should I forsake the sensate world in which I find myself equipped with senses and sentiments and instead submit myself to the determinism of a noumenal world of which I know nothing? In fact, the rational being is unable to know even the causality of the noumenal world, since it is foreign to our empirical frame of reference. ²⁶Yet despite this inability to reference, Kant is convinced that if any rational being suddenly transported himself wholly into the noumenal world he could will none other than in accordance with the immutable laws of that world. ²⁷But in what sense would that "holy" will, wholly determined as it is by the immutable laws of his noumenal world, be any more moral than the non-rational being, wholly driven by the efficient causes of the sensate world in which he lives?

If, as Kant suggests, we are to understand freedom as freedom from a sensate series of causes, and if morality itself is derived from this autonomy, how plausible is the notion that autonomy and morality consist of causal determinism by immutable laws? It is only in the sense that humans find themselves occupying both worlds that morality takes the shape of imperatives or "oughts". Just as the sensate world's natural laws are descriptive and normative in a causal sense regarding everything wholly within that world, so also are the noumenal world's laws descriptive and normative in a causal sense regarding everything wholly within that world.

If such is the case, what reason would we have for rejecting the conclusion that true morality consists simply in not fighting against the deterministic influences of the descriptive and causally normative laws of the world in which you find yourself? Perhaps Kant believes that the fact rational nature provides the possibility of interrupting this world's otherwise complete power to determine action somehow points to its inherent value above and beyond all other points of reference. But can we not posit the "holy" will residing wholly in the noumenal world as possibly aware of his ability to transgress those "immutable" laws of his world? Would it seem to him a wonderful and noble adventure to achieve entrance into our sensate world in order to succumb to the causality of our natural laws? If "freedom from determinism" is simply an artificial construct through which we imply an exalted activity of moving from one determinism to another simply because we notice that we seem to have "freedom from determinism", in what plausible way might we understand this journey to be in any sense noble?

Kant begins his theory with a rational being with each foot in a different world. The fact that the rational being may do so is due to the presence of a rational nature through which he belongs to and identifies with the noumenal world. But we must also here add that another equally valid reason that this rational being is able to thus straddle two worlds is because he possesses a human nature through which he belongs to and identifies with the sensate world. Given this scenario, Kant needs to justify his assumption that the sensate world is such that its influences need to be viewed as significantly inferior to the influences of the other. He seems to argue that this is evident based on the fact that the sensate world is merely a realm dominated by determinism by efficient causality. But by the time we are given a full picture of the noumenal realm, we find that what makes it noble is precisely what makes the sensate ignoble: causal conformity.

Another similar assumptions which Kant needs to justified is that an apparent sense of self-determinism implies the need for radical allegiance to the noumenal accompanied by repudiation of the sensate. Given the initial picture of the two-world citizen, what precludes us from expecting morality to be derived from a balance or co-dependency of world systems rather than pitting one against the other? Kant again seems to argue that the sensate is clearly inferior due to the sheer fact that it is dominated by efficient causes and that rational beings find themselves to be free from such. And as before, this argument proves to be less than convincing after we see what the noumenal world looks like. And even if we were to discover that one world deserved prominence over the other, it is really the case that we intuitively recognize Kant's noumenal world to be superior to the sensate world?

If mystery or enigma were virtue, no rational being could deny the sheer moral worth of the noumenal world. But this is not the case, and as it stands, we know very little if anything about this world of which we are said to be citizens. First, as has been pointed out, the entire discovery of this world resulted from the unexplainable sense found among all rational beings, the sense that we are not acted upon by laws of nature in the same manner as rocks, plants and rabbits. It is undeniable that something within the rational being is observably unique. And it is not an innovative notion that this difference consists primarily of humanity's rational capacity. Certainly one intuitionally supported conclusion from this would be that humanity possesses a characteristic unique from among all other creatures within the physical order, namely, the rational capacity to contemplate and decide upon an act and its worth ²⁸. Perhaps some would feel the need to elaborate a little on this definition or maybe reduce it, but in any event, we may very well agree that what we are describing is simply a characteristic belonging to human nature. There is no apparent validation for assuming that this characteristic is foreign to the physical order or that somehow it signaled the existence of a whole new world ²⁹ And yet this is precisely the path Kant claims we must travel. But why see this as necessary ?

A second problem arises from the fact that this noumenal world is abstracted to the point of being more accurately referred to as the Unintelligible World. Kant claims that the rational capacity cannot even fathom knowledge of this world, for the suspicious reason that knowledge and understanding are obtained through empirical means only. Even our super-sensory knowledge of so-called a priori truths or objects seems to have been understood by Kant to be an extension of empirical knowledge. ³⁰ The sole understanding, and hence only way in which we may determine an action to be in accordance with the dictates of the noumenal world is through the Categorical Imperative which, as we have seen, is a formula consisting of characteristics deemed necessary based on empirical argumentation. It is little wonder, then, that the Categorical Imperative is unable to prescribe any practical ethical norm in and of itself. ³¹

But one may ask the most obvious question at this point, namely, what does the radically noumenal world have to do with action of any sort? One would expect from this theory the Buddhist call to ascetic renunciation of all empirically derived understanding of oneself. Kant attempts to answer the question of how practical reason is possible by suggesting that as member qua intelligence of the noumenal world, its laws are binding on that individual. But is this an answer at all? The question remains, what does my membership in the noumenal world qua intelligence have to do with my membership in the sensate world qua efficient causes? Can it be shown that somehow action A benefits my citizenship qua intelligence to a greater degree than action B? But the damning evidence for this particular question lies in the Categorical Imperative's infamous inability to provide practical ethical norms. The proof is in the pudding. If the most concrete universally applicable formula derived from the noumenal world cannot even meet a few of the most basic ethical demands in a manner validated by even a large minority, shouldn't we look elsewhere for our ethical salvation?

A third and very puzzling problem arises from the complete inaccessible nature of the noumenal world, which requires Kant, for all practical purposes, to view the rational agent as the source of this world. In other words, Kant radically subjectivizes the entire noumenal realm within the rational agent. In this sensate world, which for Kant may in all probability be the only real world, the sole manifestation and ambassador of the noumenal realm is the rational agent. Since Kant further views the noumenal world as an Idea grounded in the phenomena of the rational nature, there exists no reason which precludes Kant from claiming that the rational agent is the noumenal world, a claim which he all but makes. Who makes the moral law? The rational agent. Who is the end or telos of the entire moral project? The moral agent? If we pursue this a little further, an interesting implication emerges. As we have pointed out, to move into the noumenal realm resulted in the will necessarily willing according to the immutable law. But if we identify the rational agent with the noumenal realm, we come to the result that the more the agent "gets in touch" with his rational capacity, the greater his will is determined by his own will, and morality lies precisely in this determination.

This may merely sound like a poor attempt at abusing Kant's position, yet the question remains, what are the full implications of Kant's claim that the rational agent is moral law giver and that the notions of noumenal world and autonomy are artificially constructed Ideas whereby rational agents make sense of the observable function of the rational capacity? How can any ethical system which derives both its authority and end from the individual who at the same time is to be subject to that norm possibly provide society with the necessary moral norms?

It is my conclusion that Kant's radical subjectivity can provide no authoritative norm for an increasingly complex society. Nor do I believe it answers the basic questions which even children ask of parents, namely, why should I? Kant's basic assumption is that pure rationality is the promised land to which all the faithful are called. I believe this assumption derives from biographical considerations rather than purely scientific ones. Kant joins his contemporaries in abandoning the classical integration of human nature and Nature as a whole. Rather than viewing rational nature as a mirror of a grander order, the philosophes declared Nature and human nature as hostile. By the time of Kant, this assumption divides human nature from human reason. But this division does not rest on a consideration of facts, but on the shaky foundation of questionable abstract theories. The fact remains: human nature is characterized by human rationality. From this fact the quest begins.

Kant sought to appeal to universals, while at the same time adamantly rejecting the possible contributions of knowledge, understanding, conscience, and emotion. True, he sought to plug some of these in here and there, but in each case, their applicability depended solely upon the degree to which each was derived from abstract reason. But whereas reason may be a wonderful teacher, it is in the case of ethics a poor role model. And this is truly the case with Kant's moral philosophy. If morality were learning or contemplation, this theory could indeed aid the individual in producing virtue. But morality lies in the will, the will to act or not act, the will to act to this degree or to that degree. Regarding these, Kant's noumenal realm had virtually nothing to offer. The study of Kant yields only a learning and respect of his brilliant attempt. What is not achieved through long contemplation of this theory is moral reformation.