Jacques Derrida's Differance: Nominalism redivivus?

prologue

Where might one begin speaking of Derrida's deconstruction and grammatology? Strangely enough, this essay will commence with Scholastic metaphysics in the hope of providing a necessary backdrop to the following discussion. Reading Derrida, one is confronted with the captivating notion of an anti-metaphysic, a critique of and proposed remedy to the entire genealogy of Western metaphysics from Aristotle onward. This essay will explore Derrida's anti-metaphysic as a central principle from which his more characteristic applications derive.

The author's motivation in writing this essay stems from the recognition of similar sentiments toward the Aristotelian legacy held by an unparalleled medieval thinker, William of Occam. In contrast to his contemporary Aquinas, whose metaphysic and theology presumed and incorporated an ontology of universals, Occam proposed a more economical view of the world, a world solely of particulars. Occam's own legacy has come to be known as Nominalism. Occam extended his nominalism consistently to a variety of fields including metaphysics, linguistics, epistemology, science and theology. His methodology and criteria for scientific knowledge are said by most to have laid the philosophical groundwork for the incredible expansion in scientific endeavor soon to follow. Thus nominalism, or at least its scientific applications, provided inquiring men with a basis of accurate investigation and representation of what the real world seemed to be.

This essay will attempt an explanation of Derrida's more characteristic notions in terms of Occam's nominalism. No demonstration of 'borrowing' or genealogical dependence is attempted or expected, as Derrida clearly sees himself as the heir of primary questions raised by much more contemporary thinkers, such as Heidegger's inquiry into the status of Being. Instead, in demonstrating similarity of principle between Occam and Derrida two interrelated implications will be established. First emerges the recognition that Derrida pits himself not against Western philosophy in toto , but against a particular, albeit predominant tradition within the West, namely ontological philosophy whose myriad offspring explicitly or implicitly utilize the notion of anterior universals. The significance of this observation is perhaps limited to the subtle distinction which, grounding Derrida's most basic conviction within Western tradition itself, allows increased anticipation of application and capacity for response to his more elusive notions. Such location also provides the student of history some precedence for inquiry into the strengths and weaknesses of such an anti-metaphysic.

And yet it is obvious that Derrida is not simply Occam redivivus , nor is his grammatology a simple rephrasing of nominalistic linguistics. What will be proposed, however, and what constitutes the second implication is that the primary difference between the ontologies of Derrida and Occam is found in Occam's understanding of individuality as constituted primarily through particular 'being'. Derrida's rejection of this notion will require the introduction of a new element whereby individuality is accounted for. This new element or principle, claims Derrida, is one of trace and differance.

One might propose that this difference, the rejection of Occam's insistence on the role of 'being', is precisely what Derrida understands as the problem with all Western metaphysic, the explicit and implicit recourse to a so-called transcendent. But it will become clear that this is not the case in light of Occam's adamant rejection of the notion of a universal 'being in itself' which will be examined below.

Let us now attempt to demonstrate what has been set forth above in order that statements made in a perhaps ambiguous manner might be clarified. It is without doubt that the notion of universals permeates the entire history of philosophy from the time of Aristotle and Plato onward. One could, therefore, enter the time line at nearly any given point and locate something relevant to this discussion. However, for our purposes, treatment is limited to a brief discussion of scholastic metaphysics and its dependence upon Aristotelian taxonomy. Occam's nominalism as impacts epistemology and metaphysics will then be examined as a response to this tradition. Our discussion will then briefly turn to Heidegger's proposal for a world-view philosophy as opposed to an ontological philosophy before our final focus upon Derrida.

a taxonomy of transcendents

Universals, as the name implies, are those 'things' which are shared by all existing and possible entities or by all existing and possible members of a particular genus or species. By 'things' are meant 'substance', 'being', 'quality' or even 'nature', depending upon which group of entities one is discussing. For example, all existing beings are understood to possess "being", all white clouds "whiteness", and all humans "human nature". Entities may also possess several universals at one time, such as the African sage possessing simultaneously being, blackness, and human nature, among other qualities such as wisdom, corporeality and rascibility.

Aristotle offered a taxonomy of universals implementing a hierarchy whereby the relation of general and specific universals was delineated. He also suggested a hierarchy of general universals which recognized "substance" ¹ as the primary category upon which the actualization of every other universal is contingent. Thus Aristotle's metaphysic has traditionally and rightfully been viewed as a philosophy of Being, that is, of ontology , whereby every particular's 'being' participates in and demonstrates a primary, transcendent universal of Being. Since all entities divine and otherwise, and all human existence, endeavor and knowledge are located within Aristotle's taxonomy, all knowledge was defined as consisting of a recognition of the 'being of a thing', the things 'quiddity'. All philosophy was aimed at uncovering the presence, role and significance of Being in all its particular forms. Here it will be necessary to understand that what Aristotle is elucidating is not merely a figmentary hierarchy useful in categorizing empirical observations. Rather, these universals are presented as realities existing in and of themselves, prior to and independent of the particular object in which they are found in the natural order. Aristotelian taxonomy posited Being as a real universal as opposed to mere concept.

One need not read far into the works of Aquinas to find Aristotle's view of universals at work. In the opening pages of the Summa Contra Gentiles Aquinas quotes 'the Philosopher' as saying: "It belongs to an educated man to seek such certitude in each thing as the nature of that thing allows." ² Aquinas later explains, "Since, indeed, the principle of all knowledge that the reason perceives about some thing is the very understanding of the substance of that being (for according to Aristotle 'what a thing is' is the principle of demonstration), it is necessary that the way in which we understand the substance of a thing determines the way in which we know what belongs to it." ³

Although a thorough discussion of Aquinas' use of universals would be well worth the investment, we limit our observation to one very important aspect of Aquinas' theory of knowledge visible in the passages above. That is, that any real knowledge of a thing as perceived by the rational capacity will consist of an understanding of the substance of that thing, the 'what a thing is". ⁴ Thus the intellect not only possesses the capability of discerning the universal within the particular, but continuously engages in such discernment as a source of real knowledge. This notion permeates Aquinas' approach to epistemology, philosophy, and theology.

With the revival of Aristotelianism, the question of how an individual thing could derive from such universals became a debated question among the Scholastics. Aquinas, on one end of the spectrum believed that the combination of two universals, existence and prime matter, resulted in individual entities. Duns Scotus, contesting that two universals could account for individuality proposed the notion of haecceity or "thusness", a radically unique individuator which when combined with universal qualities resulted in an individual which while unique also shared a common nature with other like individuals.

William of Occam, on the other hand, found no need in justifying individuality, which he deemed a self-evident reality. To him the questionable element lay in the assumption of anterior universals, which seemed to him far from being demonstrable.

nominalism: radical individuality and difference

Rather than employ a methodology which starts with the assumption of universals and ends with particulars, such as that utilized by Aristotle, Aquinas ⁵ and others, Occam will begin, as it were, from the ground up, the world of particulars. The first step in cognition for Occam always begins with the subject's encounter and observation of particulars. This perception of an object constitutes what he deems " intuitive cognitions", and serves as the basis for the self-evident existential statement " this exists". These primary intuitions and the existential statements they allow provide the ground for all inferences whether conceptual or propositional. These atomistic existential statements and their intuitive cognitions last only as long as the encounter with the particular. Once the encounter has ceased, a secondary and subordinate cognition emerges, the abstractive . ⁶

Unlike the intuitive cognition's reference to an existing particular, the abstractive cognition references only the intuitive cognition; it is a cognition of a cognition, an abstracted representation of an immediately intuited (perceived) representation ⁷ . These secondary or abstractive cognitions remain in the memory through what Occam terms "habitual" knowledge ⁸, and collectively form the basis whereby one recognizes or recalls an object as this or that. Time and experience result in an accumulation of these secondary abstractions of individual things and their varying degrees of similarity and difference. Through a comparison of all the abstractive cognitions I have accumulated, say, of a rose, my intellect again abstracts or generalizes a "common, confused, or general" concept, a universal concept ⁹ , which becomes predicable of all particular cognitions of roses.

Given their derivation, it is clear that for Occam these universal concepts do not correspond to anything above and beyond the particular, nor to anything within the particular, but are completely intramental phenomena. That is to say, there is not a universal actually shared by particulars which somehow is referenced by a universal concept, nor is there any real commonality shared among the triad of particular, universal category, and conceptualization. ¹⁰ Rather, all that can be said to be present are individuality and degrees of similarity ¹¹. For sake of greater relevance to the discussion which follows we might recognize that this is the same as saying only individuality and degrees of difference are found in the natural order. ¹² In this way, the object's individual existence provides the existential statement regarding its status, and its similarity and dissimilarity to other objects enables naming and categorizing. ¹³ Terms designating the individuality of the particular (e.g., Socrates, Rome) derive from abstractive cognitions of the object and terms designating seemingly universal qualities (e.g., human nature, Being) derive from universal concepts. ¹⁴

Occam understands spoken terms as subordinate to conceptual terms in the sense that the emergence and usefulness of a spoken term is contingent upon the presence of a corresponding concept. Spoken terms do not signify concepts, however, but both spoken and conceptual terms act as substitutes or representations of the object itself. ¹⁵ The conceptual term is utilized in the formation of mental propositions and for Occam "do not belong to any language; they remain only in the mind and cannot be uttered" ¹⁶, whereas spoken terms substitute for the object in linguistic discourse. By convention terms of language (written and spoken) are generally "fixed", such that, for example, the discovery of a new breed of cat does not result in a modification of the word "cat". Conceptual terms, on the other hand, cannot be conventionally "fixed" and are constantly updated through new experiences and concepts. So it is that a fifth grade student may have a very accurate understanding of what is meant by the term "humanity", while an aged individual having come through an experience of war has quite a different understanding. The word "humanity" then for these two individuals remains the same while their conceptual terms bear significant difference in development. This difference stems from the aged's greater number of atomistic intuitions whereby he or she was forced to admit " this is humanity". These additional cognitions are naturally incorporated into the general concept "humanity".

Of central importance to our discussion is the understanding that, for Occam, such concepts, whether abstractive or universal, do not contain within themselves anything which might be said to actually have 'come from' or be 'shared with' the object which it represents. ¹⁷ Both abstractive conceptual and linguistic terms are at least one step removed from the atomistic existential statement "that exists", and neither could be said to be vehicles whereby an actual universal is transferred or communicated from object to subject. In the place of transference is abstraction. And yet this abstraction does not preclude the possibility of an accurate representation, which Occam recognizes as necessary if all persons are to be said to "know" one and the same thing, not least of which would be God.

Occam's theology, and any other classical theology for that matter, requires a degree of conceptual univocality whereby knowledge of God, meaning in special revelation, and culpability, among other things, remain possible. Thus far, however, univocality would seem unlikely given the dependence of correct inferences upon atomistic existential statements. For whereas God is not to be found within the natural order and so is not subject to statements such as " That (God) exists", the question of how univocal inference might be drawn regarding God's Being arises.

Occam will not claim that by univocality is meant an actual correspondence of either positive qualities or knowledge between creature and Creator, but rather a univocality among general concepts held by men as to "what God is". On the limits of univocality Occam writes, "I do not know [God] in Himself as all concede, since I know Him in Himself neither intuitively nor abstractively. Not intuitively, as is manifest. Nor abstractively, since abstractive cognition always presupposes intuitive cognition... Hence I no more know God in Himself abstractively in this life than I know in himself the Pope, whom I have never seen, and whom I know only in the concept of 'man'. Hence I do not know God in Himself in this life, nor any substance." ¹⁸ The knowledge Occam does have of God is understood as not exceeding (without divine intervention) that of a general or universal concept such as 'man' which he applies to an individual (the Pope) he has never met. These abstracted universal concepts may be analogously ¹⁹ predicable of God, crossing the chasm between creature and Creator which defies crossing.

The following passage, though lengthy, speaks to the issue of univocal universal concepts and in so doing brings us one step closer to our discussion of Derrida. "The distinction between the wisdom of a creature and the wisdom of God is a great as the distinction between God and a stone ²⁰, and though in neither case do we have things of the same kind, nevertheless from created wisdom we can get by abstraction a concept common [to God and creature], but not from a stone. When 'being' is said to be the subject of metaphysics, it is to be understood in this way. And this holds not only in regard to the word 'being', but also in regard to the concept 'being'. For, I ask, what does 'being' stand for when it is said 'being' is the subject of metaphysics? Not for substance nor for an accident... It stands only for itself, namely for the concept 'being' and this concept is the subject of metaphysics. Likewise, this is the meaning when 'being' is said to be divided into created and uncreated being. 'Being' stands only for the concept in the mind, not for substance or accident." ²¹

Occam maintains a nominalistic ontology while allowing for a type of correspondence between universal concepts and God. Such concepts, however, are simply abstractive derivatives of particulars and the similarities and differences they exhibited, rather than vehicles of 'being' communicated. This, however, raises a question central to the remaining discussion. Given Occam's insistence that only individuality and degrees of difference exist within the natural order, of what might this concept of 'being' consist? ²² What is it that constitutes individuality whose abstraction results in a notion of 'being'? It is clear that although Occam stands opposed to a transcendent ontology, he nevertheless adopts a similar notion and terminology, that of some positive quality whereby we understand 'being'.

At this juncture, however, one might propose that rather than a notion of 'quiddity' or 'being', a notion of differentiation be offered as the major constitutive of individuality, a notion we might find Occam hinting at through his insistence on the exclusive existence of individuals and their differences. Under this perspective, what allows an object to exist as an individual is its greater and lesser degrees of similarity and difference in relation to other objects. One might mentally posit the simultaneous existence of two completely identical objects ²³ , but two such identical objects cannot be found to exist . Would this not at least make plausible the conclusion that whereas only particulars exist, and since what makes an object an individual in relation to other objects is differentiation, that existence is in some central way contingent upon differentiation; to exist is to exist individually. This, I believe, is the primary step separating Jacques Derrida from Occam's nominalism. Provided we adequately understand this move, we go a long way in discovering why and how Derrida dispenses nearly altogether with the notion of 'being' or 'presence' and calls for a new understanding of metaphysics wherein difference and trace connote the primary principle.

Derrida's principle of differance

Any study of Derrida presents the reader with a multifaceted application of a formidably consistent philosophy, each facet requiring substantial explanation and exploration. Perhaps his strongest impression has been felt by the literary community for reasons which can only briefly touch upon here. Central to his treatment of texts, however, as well as metaphysics, philosophy, history, and politics is a principle conviction whose out-workings result in much of his renown uniqueness. This conviction may best be understood as an anti-metaphysic and, I believe, will appear strikingly familiar to what has thus far been discussed.

Derrida's anti-metaphysic stance is not unique, but derives from his readings of Heidegger who in Being and Time and later works presented a clear argument against the philosophical monopoly created by Aristotelian ontological taxonomy. Whereas Occam's arguments were leveled solely against Aristotelians and Scholastic contemporaries, Heidegger necessarily engages an additional eight centuries of central thinkers influenced by the assumption of such universals. For this reason the tone of Heidegger's argument differs from Occam. So entrenched had the monopoly become that Heidegger pitted himself against Western philosophy in toto . Thus Heidegger espouses an "anti-metaphysic" and an end to ontological philosophy, while proposing a new 'world-view' philosophy arising solely out of encounters with the temporal existence of particular beings (Dasein). Interestingly enough, Heidegger's 'world-view' also calls for a degree of univocality which views Dasein as a positive quality shared by all beings and which makes a common (though limited) understanding possible. ²⁴

Heidegger's proposed solution to the taxonomic monopoly consists of a method of replacement, a phenomenological method involving reduction, construction, and destruction . The last of these is to be understood as "a critical process in which the traditional concepts, which at first must be necessarily be employed, are deconstructed down to the sources from which they were drawn. Only by means of this destruction can ontology fully assure itself in a phenomenological way of the genuine character of its concepts." ²⁵

Derrida will adopt both these notions, anti-metaphysic and deconstruction, yet not without some important modifications. As alluded to earlier, Derrida will discard the notion of a positive being or 'presence' and replace it with a notion designated by the neologism differance . Differance as a principle refers to Derrida's understanding of the means by which one object is temporally demarcated and defined in relation and deference to other objects. Differance offers a explanatory system whereby an object can be said to exist individually through its varying degrees of similarity and dissimilarity to other objects, and it possession of trace meaning derived from other objects past and present.

This notion of traces can be easily illustrated, for example, in the name 'blue jeans' which I apply to the comfortable trousers I now wear. I may deem my pants 'blue jeans' due to the fact that they are so in contradistinction to my polyester, corduroy, and wool slacks, all of which presently reside in my closet. Such distinctions stem from one aspect implied by Derrida's differance, that of difference. However, deeming the pants I wear 'blue jeans' inevitably implies another reality, a reality involving other more distant objects such as "Levi-Strauss", "James Dean", "cotton fields" and what not. These latter objects are neither here in my presence nor have they ever been, and yet aspects of what they were have determined in part what I mean when I use the term 'blue jeans'. This points to a second aspect implied in Derrida's differance, deferment of meaning.

This notion of differance proposed by Derrida does not differ greatly from the system of demarcation set forth by Occam. Both see the human endeavor at knowing, naming and classifying as inextricably dependent upon the sheer fact that a particular object is known, named and categorized solely through its individuality and relation to other objects. This individuality, though absolute in terms of being a singular , is either stark or subtle through degrees of similarity and difference, degrees in various qualities they share or lack. And whereas the notions of similarity and difference can only be established through a relationship of objects, we would expect Occam to consent to Derrida's notion of a deferment of meaning at play in the naming or conceptualizing of any one object.

In addition to the notion of differance, Derrida also refines Heidegger's deconstructionism, particularly the means through which it is accomplished. Basically this entails the application of a form of Hegelian dialectic to onto-philosophical terms in binary opposition. In place of Hegel's attempt to simply neutralize real binary opposites, Derrida views dialectic in terms of overturning traditional hierarchies. He explains, "in a classical philosophical opposition we are not dealing with a peaceful coexistence of a vis-a-vis , but rather a violent hierarchy", wherein "one of the two terms governs the other... or has the upper hand". ²⁶ For example, in the case of the binaries signifier/signified, the thing signified has traditionally been understood as the more primary element. In the case of speaking/writing, speaking is traditionally viewed at the truer vehicle of communication, and so forth. Such hierarchies result solely from traditional ontological presuppositions, which causes Derrida to insist that "to deconstruct the opposition, first of all, is to overturn the hierarchy." ²⁷ This overturning then results in "the irruptive emergence of a new "concept", a concept that can no longer be, and never could be, included in the previous regime." ²⁸

Let's step back a moment and gather our wits. We must ask how a new concept might emerge from this reversal of opposition. As Derrida sees it, all philosophical binaries, and indeed there are many, necessarily involve complicity in systemic error arising out of an explicit or implicit dependence upon transcendents. If such transcendents were present, these binaries would correspond to opposed realities, with any hierarchy between them stemming from real relations between the transcendents. But for Derrida, there are no such transcendents, and therefore the opposition of such binaries is arbitrary and prejudiced at best. We have also seen that for Derrida and Occam, concepts involve differentiation and abstraction of differentiation rather than the containment of any ontological presence. If this be the case, then it is to be expected that further differentiation would lead to new concepts which possess as valid a status as any previous concept. And if such differentiation derives from a treatment of terms which a universal ontology would not allow (e.g., the collapse of a binary or the overturning of a traditional hierarchy), then Derrida would indeed be correct in claiming that the newly emerging concept stands outside, and in fact could not stand within, the original ontological philosophy.

final remarks

Much more remains to be said of Derrida's system of differance and its many applications, but time and space restrict our venture. Issues of meaning, signification, thought, arch-signs and grammatology all stand before us untouched and beckoning, destined to wait for another term paper.

A few closing remarks, however remain to be made. Obviously, this paper has presented Derrida's deconstructionism solely in terms of nominalist ideology. In answer to the question of relevance, I advance the following comments. Although clear differences exists in the ideologies of Occam and Derrida, not least of which is the entire notion of deconstructionism, I believe that there can be no doubt that Heidegger and Derrida's anti-metaphysic exhibit substantial and meaningful similarity to Occam's vision of a world without universals. As I have stated before, no genealogical dependence is necessary (nor to be expected) in order for this identification to merit note. Above all, it points the involved reader toward the realization that what we are here discussing pertains to primary convictions regarding what the world is . As was the case in the middle ages so is the case today: those holding to an ontology of universals and those holding to the exclusive existence of particulars are engaged in a clash of intuitions , and this principle clash cannot be alleviated through any demonstration. These positions represent central presuppositions whereby men and women approach the world of particulars.

This is not to say, however, that applications and implications which arise out of such central convictions are beyond comparison and evaluation. Quite the contrary. As we have seen, one's ontology significantly impacts the entire realm of knowledge including theology, philosophy and science. However, arguing against an implication arising out of an opposing ontology while expecting a solution consonant with one's own is doomed to failure until one recognizes and deals with this principle source of conflict. Overlooking this source leads only to unconvincing treatment of others' ideology on the one hand and ridiculing treatments on the other. It seems clear that to deal with the linguistic theory of Derrida, one must be prepared to deal with the problem of universals.