On the Implications of the Self-Consciousness of the Divine Essence: An Examination of Augustine's Application of the Triunal Nature of Human Self-consciousness to the Godhead

The doctrine of the Trinity is that doctrine which distinguishes Christianity from among the other of the world's religions, and at the same time, is clearly the most difficult of all those belonging to Christian theology to explain or defend. Due to the Trinity's profundity, the doctrine has generally been relegated to a mere repetition of the historical statements whereby a carefully worded description of the relations of the triunity of God is set forth ¹. The foundation or justification for belief in a divine triunity has generally been attributed solely to those scriptural passages which refer to the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit as God or as capable of accomplishing tasks attributable only to divinity, while at the same time maintaining distinctions of personhood among these three. The implications of such a triunity of God have generally been stated in soteriological terms pertaining to the Old Testament theophanies, the defense of the deity of Jesus as the Incarnation or Word of God, and ministries of the Holy Spirit within the believing individual and community.

The fact that these two emphases, the scriptural and the soteriological, have remained the primary rationale and application of the triunity doctrine is consistent with Christianity's core of the Gospel as an offer of salvation via divine revelation and intervention. But as the central doctrine of the Christian faith whereby we understand the very nature of the divine Being, this triunity should indeed yield a wealth of key descriptive and explanatory insights into the nature of God, his relation to the world, as well as insights into our own nature as bearers of the imago dei ² . For the Christian claim is not merely that a triune nature is possessed by God to be employed only at times of soteriological significance. But rather, that God is the triunity, and the triunity is God, and that nothing pertains to the triunity which does not pertain to God. Everything understood to belong to God must be understood to belong to the triunity. Therefore, for the Christian, God is necessarily triune and could not be otherwise, and can no more alter his triunity than he can the fact that he is First Being. Given this understanding of the triunity, it is clear that this is a significant insight into God, which will inevitably have far reaching implications well beyond salvation history. In similar manner, given that the very nature of the First Being and First Cause is triune, we might well expect traces of this characteristic to be perceivable within the created order.

And yet hasty application of the observations of reason and experience have historically resulted in various fallacious views of or erroneous attempts to explain the triunity in terms fully consistent with the scriptural witness ³. Over-emphasis of the unity or simplicity of God's nature resulted in the Arian view of the Father and the Son as separate substances. Such a conclusion is generally based on the following argument: (1) God is simple and therefore has no accidents, (2) therefore, everything said of God is said according to substance; (3) the Father is unbegotten, and the Son is begotten; (4) therefore, the Father and Son are distinct substances. The conclusion that the Son is of a substance other than the Father necessarily entails that the Son is a creation of the Father and therefore cannot be equated with the Father in any real way. This, of course, conflicts with the orthodox attribution of deity to Jesus, clearly a central tenet of the Christian faith.

Augustine's De trinitate (400-414 AD ) is in large part a response to the Arian position ⁴ and a defense and expansion of the Nicean (325 AD ) and Niceo-Constantinopolitan (381 AD ) statements of the Doctrine of the Trinity. He will attempt to demonstrate that the substance/accident relation which the Arian argument insists exhausts the possibilities of relations within God's substance, fails to recognize the category of necessary relations . These necessary relations within the Godhead may be understood as Paternity, Filiation and Spiration , which in turn correspond to the relational titles Father, Son and Holy Spirit. These relations are not to be understood as essential properties (such as omniscience or omnipotence) nor are they accidents (such as the relation of Creator/creature). But, as we will see, these relations arise necessarily out of God as a divine Being possessing a simple nature to which is attributed Eternality, Wisdom, and Blessedness ⁵ .

Another error arising from overemphasis of the unity of God is that referred to as Sabellianism, modalism, or monarchianism. These all maintain that there is one simple divine Essence which is merely designated by three names pertaining to its relation to creation, namely, God as Creator (Father), God as Redeemer (Son), and God as Sanctifier (Holy Spirit). This view was condemned for its conclusions contend that either God would not be three persons were it not for creation ⁶ or that such "persons" are in fact impersonal expressions of the divine power ⁷. Such condemnation underscores the need for the distinction of each of the Persons, such that each is said to possess fully the divine Essence and all of its attributes. And yet an unchecled distiction of the three has historically led to tritheism, which views the term "God" as a collective reference to three divine entities, each possessing its own will and actions ⁸. Tritheism fails to reckon with the scriptural witness of the unity of God, and creates instead, a type of harmonious cooperation among three separate and distinct divine Beings. Tritheism also creates the implausible situation of three Absolute Beings, or three First Movers, etc. This is indeed a difficult position to defend, since philosophers throughout history have predominantly agreed on the necessary simplicity of the First Cause, Prime Mover, and Necessary Being, and this agreement has existed despite diverse religious and presuppositional convictions. ⁹ .

Simply stated, the Christian simplicity doctrine insists that God is a single simple substance within which exists no division whatsoever. God's nature is not a composite of qualities as is human nature, for this would then make God's existence as God dependent upon the existence and availability of such qualities ¹⁰. Nor do God's qualities or attributes inhere in God as accidents within a substance, for this would require a degree of potentiality to be present in God, a state which is taken as impossible for the Absolute Being (as Absolute Actuality) ¹¹. Therefore, the claim that "God is love", must be understood to imply that he is so wholly and essentially, such that love is to be equated with God's very existence. The same must also be said of God pertaining to his wisdom, life, justice, righteousness, etc..

These implications of the simple nature of the divine Being have raised the question among philosophical theologians as to how this divine Being is to be understood as possessing Personality ¹² . For it is clear that the entire system of Christian beliefs is irrevocably grounded in the central belief that God is a personal Being capable of rationality, volition, communication and relations with beings outside itself ¹³. And yet these qualities of personality or self-consciousness, as we humanly know and understand them, seem to require a degree of division within the nature of the person, a fact which seems to collide with the simple nature of God ¹⁴. For example, questions such as the following inevitably arise from such seeming disparity: How might we account for a divine Will given the fact that God is radically and simply All-Sufficient in and of Himself, without need of willing anything? What meaningful alternatives and options are present to a radically simple Being such that we might account for there being a Will? Or how can a Being of such radical unity be equated with love as God is in 1 John 4:16? Surely any concept of love requires a relation or appreciation (via reflection) of some sort. Is God then equated with love only in relation to creation rather than eternally?

Were it not for the doctrine of triunity, historical Christianity may well have been forced to relinquish either the classical simplicity doctrine (a move which jeopardizes God's sovereignty) or the conviction that God possesses personhood (a move which would make nearly the entire Christian system of beliefs implausible), or else simply relegate the entire discussion to that area which is beyond the minds of men and grasped only by faith (a move which seems to admit that the central tenet of Christianity is beyond rational explanation). For the presence of a triune nature within the divine Being, which is radically simple in its essence, yet at the same time found to necessarily imply the presence of three divine persons, appears to be precisely that link which, if plausible, enables the Christian to justify a rational belief in both the radical unity and personality of God. And therefore it is at this juncture that the doctrine of the triunity moves out of its merely descriptive role and offers itself as an explanatory tool for the adept theologian.

This paper will examine and critique one such adept theologian's handling of this doctrine. Our focus will be Augustine's application of an analogy drawn from the triune nature of human self-consciousness to the divine triunity. Our aim is that of discerning what implications the presence of divine self-consciousness will have in regard to the divine unity and triunity.

Orthodox Terminology and Parameters

Before entering into a discussion pertaining to the Trinity, it will be profitable to recall the customary terminology and orthodox parameters which any statement of the doctrine must take into consideration. The following is a summary of the nomenclature of the Nicene statement of the doctrine of the Trinity ¹⁵ :

1. Ousia (with its equivalent fusij), to which corresponds the Latin terms substantia, essentia, natura , and res , finds its English equivalents in substance, essence, nature , and being . This refers to the unified or constitutional Being or Essence of the deity which is possessed equally or consubstantially [ homoousion ] of the three. The Essence is in its own nature one and indivisible, and is thereby understood to be a simple unity. To the Essence then belongs the divine attributes of wisdom, love, life , etc., (as these are common to all three Persons) but not the hypostatical attributes of eternally begotten and proceeding . The whole fulness of the Essence, with all its attributes, is in all the Persons of the Trinity, though in each in its own way: In the Father as original principle, in the Son by eternal generation, in the Spirit by eternal procession. Therefore there is not one divine Essence and three Persons, but one Essence in three Persons. In this sense, the three Persons cannot be understood to be three separate individuals, but are in one another, and form a soldaric unity ¹⁶ .

2. Hupostasis (with its equivalents to upoceimenon and proswpon), to which corresponds the Latin terms hypostasis, substantia, aspectus , and persona , finds its English equivalents in hypostasis , subsistence , and person . Hypostasis denotes the three different modes of subsistence of the one undivided and whole Essence. Each hypostasis or Person expresses the whole fulness of the Essence with all its attributes, and thereby each possess perfectly mutual love and knowledge of the others. To the Hypostases belong the distinctions Father, Son and Holy Spirit, as well as begetting, begotten and proceeding . It is necessary here to distinguish between the terms Person ¹⁷ (with which hypostasis is often equated) and Personality or Personhood (which is equated with Self-consciousness ¹⁸ in this discussion). The latter refers to that characteristic of self-knowledge and volition common to all three Persons whereas the former denotes that distinct hypostasis of the divine Essence which must necessarily be distinguished from the other two. Although all three share the designation person, the really signified by the specific application of the term to this hypostasis as opposed to that, is a reality not shared with the others. And by reality is here meant only that by which the designation person is applicable, a qualification which, in the case of the divine Trinity, cannot pertain to the divine Essence, as it is shared fully by the three.

3. Idiwthj, to which corresponds the Latin proprietas and English property denotes the individual peculiarity of the hypostasis which cannot be communicated or transferred from one Person to another. To the first Person alone belongs the property of being unbegotten, fatherhood, or Paternity; to the second Person alone belongs the property of being begotten, sonship or Filiation; and to the third Person alone belongs the property of procession or Spiration..

4. Gennesis, to which corresponds the Latin generatio , finds its English equivalent in generation , and designates the eternal and immanent activity by which the first Person communicates the divine Essence to the second.

5. Ecporeusij (with its equivalent ecpemyij), to which corresponds the Latin terms processio and missio , finds its English equivalents in the terms procession and mission . Procession denotes the hypostatical character and relationship by which the first and second Persons ¹⁹ communicate the divine Essence to the Holy Spirit, and is derived from John 15:15 and similar passages. "But when the Comforter is come, whom I will send (pemyw) unto you from the Father, even the Spirit of truth, which proceedeth (o ecporeuetai) from the Father, he shall testify of me."

In addition to consideration of such terminology and concepts, Augustine's treatment of the Trinity also needs to remain within the following orthodox parameters ²⁰: (1) God is one and only one substance. (2) There are three and only three divine Persons. (3) God operates with one will and one action in relation to creatures ²¹ . (4) Divine essential properties are always predicated in the singular and not in the plural ²² . And (5) there is no subordination among the Persons, since each shares fully in the single divine Essence.

A Question of Location

The question which will be addressed most specifically in this paper pertains to the relation between Personality and Trinity within the one Essence. As has been sufficiently stated above, divine Unity appears to be a commonly understood necessity for any truly First Being, Mover, and Cause. While Personality is necessarily attributed to God in the Judeo-Christian system of belief. The difficulty, as we have seen, in assigning Personality to the divine Unity arises from an apparent conflict between the necessarily simple nature of the Unity, and the seemingly necessary internal divisions required for Personality. It would seem that either unity exists, making Personality within the Essence impossible or Personality exists making the true unity of the Essence impossible. The doctrine of triunity offers a possible resolution to this logical puzzle. But being derived almost exclusively from the witness of Scripture, the doctrine of the Trinity possesses only as much explanatory power as one is willing to ascribe to Scripture as an accurate vehicle of divine Self-disclosure. For if one doubts the accuracy of the claims of Scripture, or merely only those statements pertaining to the nature of God, one would likewise necessarily doubt the meaningfulness of the historical commitment to the doctrine of the Trinity.

Therefore Augustine's application of human psychological models to the unity of the Essence becomes a possible solution to locating the logical plausibility ²³ of the trinity in a source other than divine Revelation. His treatment of the triunity in De Trinitate is twofold, dealing first (books 1-7) with the Trinity as testified to in Scripture wherein we find the necessary relations and equalities which must be accounted for in any accurate statement of the doctrine of the Trinity. Scripture provides us with an affirmation of the Unity of God ²⁴, the number and designations of the Persons of the Godhead (Father, Son, Holy Spirit) , as well as the nature of the relationships between these Persons ²⁵. Scripture also points to an ordering among the three Persons whereby the first Person is the eternal ground for the second Person, and these two Persons are the eternal ground for third Person, and yet all are referred to as one God, pointing to each Person's sharing in the complete divine Essence.

After dealing with the Scriptural witness of the nature of the Trinity, Augustine turns to what he believes to be possible analogies to the divine triunity found within the human person (books 8-15). He will predominantly locate these analogous trinities within the imago dei , which Augustine understands to be (perhaps among other things) the rational capacity, for it is humanity's possession of this capacity that obviously elevates it above all other animals. In the rational capacity of the individual, Augustine will find several trinities which are necessary to its operation. The analogous trinity relevant to this discussion is that of the mind's self-consciousness, a trinity comprised of the mind itself, self-knowledge and self-love. Although this analogous trinity found within the finite person fails to fully demonstrate the unique nature of the divine trinity, the fact that it derives from the imago dei points to its being an possible insight into the very nature of God, the Reality reflected in the image.

For if the rational capacity is indeed that image of God in humans, and within that capacity is evident a trinity necessary to its operation, may not the triune nature of the image be said to possibly reflect a triune nature of the Subject of the image? The answer to this question will determine the value of Augustine's entire argument from analogy, for if one claims that the divine nature is too far removed, too foreign to the nature of man, then one must also conclude that nothing observable within man or nature is accurately applicable to God as truly analogous. Yet such an objection seems unwarranted due to our willingness to ascribe other human concepts to God such as First Cause, Goodness, Wisdom, etc.. With the exception of the limitation of finiteness inherent in the human concepts we thus ascribe, we believe them to in fact describe the very nature of God. If we are so confident in ascribing such concepts which are grasped by our rational capacity, how much more should we be willing to ascribe to God those concepts arising from the workings of the internal principles of that same rational capacity, which itself is said to be created in the image and likeness of God? This is the project which Augustine lays before the reader of De trinitate , a project which turns to the imago dei for insight into the nature of God. Augustine in no way expects to find the very nature of God within the human rational capacity, but rather an obscure image whereby an analogy to the unique divine Nature becomes possible.

Justifying the Application of Analogy

In order to justify this use of analogy, Augustine turns to Paul's statement in 1 Corinthians 13:12, "For now we see in a mirror dimly [di esoptrou en ainigmati], but then face to face." Paul's use of the term mirror seems to imply simply that what finite humans perceive of God is in all respects to be understood as a mere image of the Reality ²⁶ . This "image" of the divine Reality is precisely the imago dei within the individual, such that the image we see in Paul's mirror is none other than ourselves as bearers of this divine image. Paul's statement indicates that the image we see as a reflection of a divine Reality, we will one day see face to face. And a closer look at the 1 Corinthians passage reveals that in the immediate context of Paul's mention of this "image", he speaks specifically of the functions of rationality:

"When I was a child, I talked like a child, I thought like a child, I reasoned like a child. When I became a man, I put childish ways behind me. Now I see but a poor reflection ; then we shall see face to face. Now I know in part; then I shall know fully , even as I am known ." (1 Co 13:11-12; NIV, italics mine)

Given this explicit emphasis by the Apostle on the quality of knowledge in regards to his discussion of the image, we may safely assume that Paul is indeed linking the image with the internal rational operation whereby truths are discerned. This is Augustine's understanding as well, who here sees a clear rationale for assuming that we find in the imago dei some degree of correspondence to the divine Reality, and that this image is rightly located in the mind.

Augustine then exegetes the term enigma [ainigmati] in order to better determine to what extent the image perceived corresponds to the divine Reality, for Paul clearly uses this term to indicate a limitation which we must then expect in our attempts to perceive the Reality behind the image. An enigma is a species of allegory. An allegory "signifies one thing by another" ²⁷in various degrees of clarity, such that the meaning or signification of some allegories is plain to all except the simplest of individuals while other allegories present significations which are obscure and difficult to grasp. This latter type of allegory is by definition an enigma. Nevertheless, despite obscurity, an enigma, as do all allegories, maintains a corresponding signification.

Therefore, by seeing in a mirror enigmatically , Paul may indeed be saying that what is perceived in the image is indeed a signification of Reality but that this image is not easily discerned. ²⁸ It is this possibility which allows for a justification and defence of the pursuit of a more precise understanding of the imago dei in man with the expectation of discerning to some degree the Reality reflected in the image.

"Let no one, then, wonder, that we labor to see in any way at all, even that fashion of seeing which is granted to us in this life, viz. through a glass, in an enigma. For we should not hear of an enigma in this place if sight were easy. And this is a yet greater enigma, that we do not see what we cannot but see. For who does not see his own thought? And yet who does see his own thought, I do not say with the eyes of the flesh, but with the inner sight itself? Who does not see it, and who does see it?" ²⁹

This reflected image is, then, located within the individual's imago dei , human rationality, and finds its enigmatic quality in man's seeming difficulty in discerning those ideas which pertain solely to one's own mind and the knowledge thereof from the multitude of ideas and knowledge derived through perceptions and thoughts of the external world. For the imago dei is only seen in the contemplation of itself as an eternal spiritual reality, the image of God ³⁰ and such contemplation is only possible if we remove from our understanding of the imago dei all false attributions which we are so wont to ascribe to it through our consistent interaction with the external world ³¹ . This may appear to be a mystical approach to discerning the imago dei by disciplining the mind to gaze upon itself while whittling away falsely attributed temporal concepts. But Augustine here seems to be arguing simply against those who attempt to define the mind in terms of concepts found within the mind, without discernment between temporal and eternal concepts. He argues at length against those who ascribe erroneous concepts to the soul and sees such errors as resulting primarily from false attribution of temporal concepts to the mind. ³² Rather than prescribing a mystical practice whereby the imago dei is intuited directly, the claim here is simply that the imago dei is seen only in those operations belonging properly to the mind. Any false attribution will inevitably produce an erroneous understanding of the imago dei .

In the light of the Scriptural admission, then, that an allegory, though obscure, exists and that the image perceived in the imago dei does in fact correspond to a degree to the divine nature of which it is an image, one is reasonably compelled to isolate and comprehend the image itself in order that its allegory be revealed. And this is Augustine's next task, involving analysis of the operation of the rational capacity, the location of the imago dei . But as this analysis incorporates a particular understanding of the nature of knowledge, a brief consideration of Augustine's basic system of epistemology would be profitable.

Augustinian Epistemology

Augustine's understanding of knowledge is that the mind of the finite being is privy to two spheres of knowledge, whereby it formulates its understanding of the physical world, itself, and God. The sphere of primary importance to this discussion offers the mind knowledge of forms or intelligible species which are eternal and unchangeable. The mind has access to such knowledge in and of itself as the imago dei , and finds within itself alone these eternal and unchangeable forms ³³ . These forms, such as God, righteousness, love and rationality, are intuited and thereby capable of being known and loved ³⁴ without being seen in any empirical sense ³⁵ . The second sphere of knowledge to which the finite mind has access offers changeable forms derived from sensory experience. This is the sphere encountered most commonly and accounts for the conceptual framework with which humans understand the physical world in which they find themselves. In both spheres, the mind grasps specific and general concepts whereby particulars are understood ³⁶. The physical realm yields forms which prove to be finite and changeable, due to their derivation from temporal realities. The noumenal realm alone yields eternal forms whereby humanity gains insight into transcendent realities.

The mind desires or wills to know a particular thing yet unknown through its familiarity with the general or specific concept of which the particular is a member. The mind's familiarity with the specific concept fosters appreciation for that concepts as a perfection, and this appreciation spawns desire on behalf of those particulars which belong to the concept ³⁷. Therefore, without the mind's initial knowledge of the general or specific concept, the mind is not compelled to gain knowledge of any particular belonging to that concept ³⁸. From this Augustine concludes that the mind can never know that which it is completely unfamiliar with, implying that the mind must already be familiar with the such concepts as God, righteousness, love and rationality.

According to the same epistemology, it is clear also that the mind cannot possibly love that which it does not know. For love of the object stems solely out of familiarity with the species, through which a desire [ appetitus ] is spawned, which then becomes love which embraces the knowledge it desired. When love finally embraces the object of its desire, its bond unites the mind with its new knowledge ³⁹. We see therefore, the three essential elements of understanding, namely, mind, knowledge, and love. This triunity will yield its greatest insight only when we apply it to knowledge pertaining to those eternal forms of which the mind intuits.

Augustine applies this epistemological triunity to the case of an individual's love for God. It has already been defended that love for anything requires the mind's familiarity with the form to which the object can be ascribed. Therefore, it would seem necessary that the mind of the individual possesses such familiarity with a form ascribable to the divine Being. In the case of eternal forms, to which this form of the divine must be included, the mind derives its familiarity through intuition by reason. Here, in order to arrive at an accurate understanding of this form, the individual must discern those temporal concepts which are inadvertently combined with the eternal form, lest understanding of the latter be confounded by the former.

But what is this eternal form whereby the divine Being is made familiar to the individual and which the mind now seeks within itself? As has been made clear in the discussion above, this eternal form is the imago dei or image of God whereby the very likeness of God in inscribed upon human nature. Through this imago dei , present within every member of humanity, each individual is enabled to love a God whom they have never empirically experienced and to grasp the concept of a God whose shape or appearance they have never seen ⁴⁰ . The imago dei alone presents the individual with a reliable concept whereby God is understood and loved, and therefore it is necessary that one's understanding of the imago dei attributes to it only that which truly belongs. This discernment requires a discipline of the mind whereby thoughts and concepts arising from external experiences are removed from the imago dei itself, whereby clearer insight is offered into the latter.

This, however, is all the more difficult given the fact that the imago dei is rationality itself, and therefore is the medium through which all thought and knowledge passes, and at the same time, the object under scrutiny. Thus a hasty reckoning of what pertains to the mind may well mistakenly ascribe to it a concept which was simply residing in the mind. Nor is the mind passive in its reception of knowledge, but rather necessarily participates to a degree in the form in conceives ⁴¹. For this reason, errors abound regarding the nature of the incorporeal realities such as God and the soul, for the mind continually is wont to attribute corporeal concepts or aspects to such. As stated above, Augustine sees this is as responsible for the enigmatic quality of the imago dei in man. For although it exists within human rationality, the mind itself fails to discern it, but rather is generally swept along by the persistent tide of temporal concepts which are inadvertently ascribed to its understanding of the imago dei .

But whereas the obscure imago dei presents the individual with some difficulties due to its elusiveness, it likewise offers the individual insights into the very nature of eternal realities. The individual need look no further than oneself to discover the very image of God and the love of God which flows from it.

The Triunity of Human Self-consciousness

Based on the epistemology outlined above, Augustine will now look for the imago dei in the mind's operations pertaining to self-knowledge and self-love. For as we have seen, a correct understanding of the imago dei requires that all other externally derived concepts be removed from our concept of it, which implies that our aim is a pure knowledge of our own mind. The mind knows itself through itself, such that the object known is the same as the subject knowing. In like manner the mind loves itself through itself, for the mind itself is compelled or wills [voluntas] to embrace itself as its object; the lover becomes also the loved. These two phenomena, self-knowledge and self-love, are organically related in that the object of each has been equated with the subject of each, namely the mind. Yet self-love is not synonymous with self-knowledge, but are distinguishable despite their origin in the same mind. These three then the mind, self-knowledge, and self-love, form a trinity within the operation of the mind.

When the mind's knowledge of itself is perfect, that knowledge is equal to the mind itself. For if indeed every aspect of the mind is known perfectly by itself, that knowledge will in all ways be identical the knowing mind. In the same way, when the mind's love of itself is perfect, that is to say, when the mind perfectly embraces its own form or intelligible species, that love is in all ways identical to the mind (and its knowledge) ⁴². Such perfect love and knowledge would require the mind's continuous beholding of itself apart from any inappropriate conceptual attributions. Therefore, such knowledge and love is not accomplished by the human mind in its present condition, for all humans at times fail to behold themselves in this manner. Even as the individual sleeps, one's mind is averted in its gaze of itself, as also during attention given to external physical objects. Yet Augustine proceeds in this development with the conviction that this inability to know and love oneself perfectly will be removed in the life to come. For as Paul wrote, although we see with difficulty at present, we will see as face to face. (1 Co 13:12) Therefore, to the mind belongs this possibility, even though it remains unrealized in the present life.

In an attempt to further elucidate the nature of this equality, Augustine ascribes substantiality to all three members of this trinity. He seems to defend this claim by pointing to the fact that knowledge and love do not merely belong to the mind as qualities contained in a subject, since the mind has access to knowledge and love pertaining to objects outside itself ⁴³ . Augustine's intent here is to first attribute each of this triunity, mind, love and knowledge, the status of substance, thereby allowing them all to be equated on that ground. For if all three are substances, and yet each is found to be equal with the others, as has been asserted, then either there is a commingling of substances whereby the substance of each is confounded by the others, or all three share the same substance, namely, the mind. Of course, the latter solution is precisely where Augustine would lead us. He writes, "I cannot see how those other three are not of the same substance, since the mind itself loves itself, and itself knows itself; ...These three, therefore, must needs be of one and the same essence; and for that reason, if they were confounded together as it were by commingling, they could not be in any way three, neither could they be mutually referred to each other." (9.4.7) Augustine here is attempting to derive an analogy of the consubstantiality of the three Persons of the divine Trinity.

His attempt, however, falls short in its persuasiveness. For as Shedd points out, no psychology of any era has attributed such agencies or activities of the mind as knowing and loving with substantiality. Rather, these activities are generally viewed as the mind's energizings or workings. ⁴⁴In this way, although this analogy may be applied to the triunity of the divine Essence, it fails to illustrate how each of the three divine Persons are each substantial. For the second and third Persons do not exist as mere workings or energizings of the substance of the Father, but must be found to possess substance in and of themselves. Augustine is aware of this and therefore attempts to demonstrate the substantiality of love and knowledge within the human self-consciousness. His failure to persuasively accomplish this may in greater part be due to the composite human nature in which substantial inequality is necessarily made between mind, knowledge and love. And it is this obvious inequality which causes the reader to question Augustine's conclusion here. But within the simple nature of the divine, where perfect self-knowledge and perfect self-love are found, we need not exclude the ascription of substantiality to these energizings of the divine mind. For in the simple nature perfect love and knowledge must be equated with the divine Substance (Essence), as explained above. And if these two conditions exist, namely, that each shares the same substance, and each is equal to the other two, then such "energizing" are found to be equal to the mind in both content and substance. Yet, to remain consistent with his project, Augustine must not allow himself to argure from the simple nature to the composite, as he seems to be here doing. For it is indeed difficult to see how, within the finite mind, thought and love can be attributed with a substantiality equal to that of the mind. As discussed below, this move may be due to Augustine's use of an almost ideal created rationality as the basis of his theory. But even then, substantiality seems to elude such energizings.

It is Augustine's view that when one's knowledge of oneself is perfect, that knowledge becomes equal to oneself. Based on his ascription of substantiality to knowledge, in such a case, the substance of one's knowledge becomes equal with the substance of one's mind. The same holds true for the substance of love and the substances of the lover and form loved. Therefore, although these three, mind, knowledge and love, exist separately as substances, and are equal to each other in the case of perfection, they do not exist so distinctly as to make themselves merely relatives to each other. For the substance of love is a necessary condition for the existence of the self-lover, and the substance of knowledge is a necessary condition for the existence of the self-knower, and without these two conditions, the mind is unable to know or love itself.

The relations of mind to knowledge, mind to love, and love to knowledge, are not merely that of substance and qualities, as that between a color and the colored object. Nor are knowledge and love to be considered parts of the mind, since perfect self-knowledge is by definition a knowledge of the whole mind which exists, and one cannot know the whole mind which exists if that mind is only in part without knowledge. Either the whole mind is present to attain whole self-knowledge, or those parts of the mind which are unknown remain such continuously, since those unknown parts of the mind can in now way account for a knowledge of those same parts. Nor can the known parts of the mind obtain knowledge of the uknown parts of the mind if the latter are indeed unknown. Therefore the mind, in order to achieve self-knowledge must have a knowledge of itself as a whole, whereby the whole of self-knowledge alone is made possible. ⁴⁵Rather than defining the knowledge to mind relation as part to whole, both knowledge and mind must be understood as wholes, and when self-knowledge is knowledge of the mind as whole, the mind cannot be said to seek after itself.

The conclusion here is that these three, mind, knowledge, and love, must be seen to be three wholes of the same substance, for the mind itself loves itself, and the mind itself knows itself, while both knowledge and love embrace the totality of the mind itself. Each of these separate three are inextricably linked to the other two, for without any one of the three, the other two cease to exist ⁴⁶. Each of the three is found in is entirety within the other two and each's substance is the same as the other two. Augustine sees in this a clear trinity. "But in this three, when the mind knows itself and loves itself, there remains a trinity: mind, love, knowledge; and this trinity is not confounded together by any commingling: although they are each severally in themselves and mutually all in all, or each severally in each two, or each two in each. Therefore all are in all." (9.5.8). As stated above, although we may question his conclusion regarding the subtantiality of love and knowledge, Augustine here, nevertheless, establishes an analogous trinity within human self-consciousness. The argument for consubstantiality would best be argued from the simple nature of the divine Essence, rather than seeking to equate these three substantially in the human mind.

This trinity yields further elucidation regarding the nature of the relationships between mind, love and knowledge, specifically pertaining to the mind's begetting of "words". As noted above, the mind through simple intelligence and reason grasps and discerns eternal forms ⁴⁷. This grasping and discerning is a process within finite minds, and therefore thoughts of differing degrees of accuracy are spawned. These thoughts are formed representations of the eternal form, and to the degree that the thought accurately conforms the eternal form, the thoughts itself takes on the resemblance of that form. Augustine refers to the thought spawned or conceived as "a word within us" ⁴⁸ . In this way, as the mind moves toward a complete grasp of a form, the knowledge which results becomes for the mind a word which is conceived in the mind, with the more complete the mind's grasp of the form, the more complete the word's resemblance to the actual form.

We have already seen this idea implemented in Augustine's detail of the operations involved in self-knowledge. For the mind has initially an intuited form of the imago dei , namely, its own rationality, which is an eternal form and therefore does not rely upon empirical experience in order to communicate its content. The mind is compelled toward the eternal form through its obscure recognition of it by the desire for full knowledge of the form, deeming such as a valuable to be pursued. The mind thereby wills to know itself. When the mind's knowledge of itself is perfect or exhaustive, that knowledge is equal to the mind knowing. Using Augustine's "word" analogy, we now see that what equals the mind itself is the mind's word or representation of itself. Such words resulting from eternal forms, such as that of the imago dei , when perfect, become themselves unchangeable, for they are accurate and complete representations of unchangeable forms.

Following the formation or conception of this unchangeable word, the initial compelling desire causing the mind to pursue greater knowledge of itself gradually becomes a love which embraces the newly conceived word due to its resemblance of that form which was desired from the beginning. It is this love which conjoins the mind and the word, creating a bond which serves as a third element in the mind's birth of a word. ⁴⁹ In love, therefore, the word is conceived ⁵⁰, and in love the word in united with the mind from which it was begotten. In the case of perfect self-love and self-knowledge, then, the word which is conceived by the mind is a perfect representation of itself. And the same word which the mind loves and embraces is likewise the representation of itself. These three things then are found to form a trinity: the mind, its word, and love.

Augustine writes, "A word, then, which is the point we now wish to discern and intimate, is knowledge together with love. Whenever, then, the mind knows and loves itself, its word is joined to it by love. And since it loves knowledge and knows love, both the word is in love and love is in the word, and both are in him who loves and speaks (i.e., begets the word)." (9.10.15; addition mine) The relation of word to the mind, then, is one of begotten and begetter, for out of the mind and love, the word is brought forth. But the relation of love to mind is not that of begotten to begetter, since this desire [ appetitus ] precedes the knowledge begotten and proceeds from the mind itself. In this way love is not begotten as if it were at one time not, but rather love proceeds continually from the mind and thereby enables the mind to love itself even before it actually acquires such self-love. For without love, the mind could in no way come to love itself. Nor could the mind possibly come to know itself without the initial love it possesses for knowing itself.

This begetting of a word within the human mind is likewise an analogy of how the Divine Word is begotten of God. "Whoever, then, is able to understand a word, not only before it is uttered in sound, but also before the images of its sounds are considered in thought... is able now to see through this glass and in this enigma some likeness of that Word of whom it is said, 'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God'." (15.10.19) Here, although Augustine desires to compare this process within the human mind to that process whereby the divine Word is begotten of the Father, we find the same inability to account for the substance which must be attributed the divine Word. Humanly begotten words, no matter how completely they resemble the mind from which they are begotten, in no way achieve substantiality. Therefore, we find again a limit in Augustine's analogy between the triunity of human self-consciousness and the divine Trinity. However, the same possible solution may also here be applied, namely, that the simple nature of the divine Essence may indeed allow, if not necessitate, the substantiality of that Word whereby the entire Essence of the Father is fully known. ⁵¹Augustine seems to attribute this difference between the human and divine Self-consciousness to a difference between composite and simple natures in a later discussion on the limitations of the trinitarian analogy. ⁵²"These things, then, can be said by a single person, which has three, but is not three. But in the simplicity of that Highest Nature, which is God, although there is one God, there are three persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit." (15.22.42)

Another similarity proposed by Augustine between the human word and divine Word is found in the manner in which the human word precedes uttered speech, yet is capable of being embodied in sound without altering its existence. This points to the manner in which the existence of the Divine Word as such remains intact throughout the incarnation.

"For our word is so made in some way into an articulate sound by which it may be manifested to men's senses, as the Word of God was made flesh, by assuming that flesh in which itself also might be manifested to men's senses. And as our word becomes an articulate sound, yet is not changed into one; so the Word of God became flesh, but far be it from us to say that He was changed into flesh. For both that word of ours became an articulate sound, and that other Word became flesh, by assuming it, not by consuming itself so as to be changed into it." (15.11.20)

It is perhaps clear at this point how Augustine views this trinity of the process of human self-consciousness as analogous to the divine Trinity. Thus far, he is able to confidently assert, "there is a kind of Trinity in the mind itself, and the knowledge of it, which is its offspring and its word concerning itself, and love as a third, and these three are one, and one substance. Neither is the offspring less, since the mind knows itself according to the measure of its own being; nor is the love less, since it loves itself according to the measure both of its own knowledge and of its own being." (9.12.18)

Let us here ask to what degree this analogous trinity is to be applied to the Godhead. Is this human trinity analogous in form only, such that the correlation arises solely from the observation that the imago dei contains phenomena whereby three distinct things share a common substance? ⁵³ Surely this is a significant correspondence within the analogy, but this simple application overlooks the significance of the imago dei as the vehicle of reflection. What may we infer from the fact that the same image which bears traces of the Trinity is also the foundation for humanity's rationality and self-consciousness? Cannot we not seek to draw an analogy from the content of the imago dei, as well as its processes?

Augustine will in fact understand the content of the image, namely, self-consciousness, as being applicable to the Godhead. By finding a necessary trinity within human self-awareness, Augustine concludes that divine Self-awareness must also entail a trinity. For to God belongs the attributes of wisdom, love and knowledge, among others, and it is within the human participation in these very attributes that we find the analogous trinity. Augustine writes,

"Does that wisdom which God is said to be, not perceive itself, and not love itself? Who would say this? Or who is there that does not see, that where there is no knowledge, there in no way is there wisdom? Or are we, in truth, to think that the Wisdom which is God knows other things, and does not know itself; or love other things, and does not love itself? But if this is a foolish and impious thing to say or believe, then behold we have a trinity, to wit, wisdom, and the knowledge wisdom has of itself, and its love of itself. For so, too, we find a trinity in man also, i.e., mind, and the knowledge wherewith mind knows itself, and the love wherewith it loves itself." (15.6.10)

Thus, Augustine draws an explicit parallel between the conditions necessary in human self-consciousness and the proposed conditions necessary in divine Self-consciousness. This parallel retains the same elements of knowledge and love, although in the case of the divine Trinity, these are to be understood as eternal and infinite. And rather than attributing a mind to God (in the reference above), Augustine equates God with an active Wisdom which presumably necessarily possesses both Self-knowledge and Self-love.

This understanding of the trinitarian implications of Self-consciousness within the divine Essence is advocated by more modern thinkers as well. Dorner, for example, applies the human triunity of self-consciousness to the Godhead, since it is impossible that God is merely absolute Thought, but also must be attributed with Knowledge ⁵⁴ . Almost echoing Augustine, he points out, "God is also Knowledge not only of things different from Himself, but of Himself primarily " ⁵⁵. He also asserts that the "more mature consideration teaches that the absolute divine Self-consciousness can only be thought of in a trinitarian manner". Shedd also feels that the claim, "that the sphere of self-conscious existence may perhaps furnish an analogical illustration seems to be less and less doubted, as metaphysical psychology advances". He then offers a "tentative effort" in providing "proof that the necessary conditions of self-consciousness in the finite spirit furnish an analogue to the doctrine of the trinity, and go to prove that trinity in unity is necessary to self-consciousness in the Godhead." He continues, "God is not 'one' like a stone or tree, or any single thing in nature. He is 'one' like a person. It may be presumed, therefore, that the same conditions which we find to exist in the instance of human personality, will be found in the instance of the Divine self-consciousness, only freed from the limitations of the finite." ⁵⁶ Although both Dorner and Shedd employ more modern terminology ⁵⁷, both agree with the Augustinian construction of mind as subject, mind as object of knowledge (i.e., word), and a unifying or reflexive principle (love).

Of course vast differences are to be found between this trinity of human self-consciousness and the divine Trinity. It has been clear throughout the entire discussion thus far that human self-consciousness has been described in terms of a process in which awareness and discernment form gradually. Such temporal sequencing can not be applied to God, since it is impossible for God to have once lacked any knowledge which is now possessed ⁵⁸. Nor is it possible that God is currently in the process of Self-Realization, since God's knowledge and love are eternal and infinite, such that both are complete without reliance upon development or process ⁵⁹. A dissimilarity is also found in the fact that the human mind is subject to error and false attribution of finite forms to eternal forms and vice versa. This imperfection, however, cannot be assigned to God, who knows all things perfectly and discerns the nature of all things perfectly. God is not confounded in knowing himself, but rather knows himself above all things. A further difference between the trinities is found in the fact that the divine Trinity comprises the totality of the Godhead, and nothing outside of the Trinity is to be found within the Godhead. Nor does anything pertain to the Godhead which does not likewise pertain to the Trinity. ⁶⁰

But perhaps the most significant difference between these trinities is that self-consciousness belongs to each Person of the divine Trinity. Therefore, according to the analogy applied, both the word and the love, along with the mind itself, possess self-consciousness. In human terms this is simply incompatible with the definition of human personality as it would entail the actual presence of three separate personalities within one individual. Nor can self-consciousness be possessed by human thought or love, no matter how complete or perfect that self-knowledge or self-love might be. This disanalogy, however, need not undermine the application of the triune analogy of human self-consciousness to God, for as Berkhof points out,

"We should be careful not to set up man's personality as the standard by which the personality of God must be measured. The original form of personality is not in man, but in God; His is archetypal, while man's is ectypal. The latter is not identical with the former, but does contain faint traces of similarity with it. We should not say that man is personal, while God is super-personal (a very unfortunate term), for what is super-personal is not personal; but rather, that what appears as imperfect in man, exists in infinite perfection in God. The one outstanding difference between the two is that man is uni-personal, while God is tri-personal." ⁶¹

Augustine seems to hint at the notion that tri-personality may indeed be the archetypal personality in his continual use of the hypothetically unhindered mind able to remove from itself all temporal concepts, thereby achieving the equality of perfect knowledge and perfect love with the mind itself. For here, it must here be reiterated, Augustine does not describe a process possible to human individuals in physico-temporal existence ⁶². Indeed, Shedd asserts confidently, "No man has ever yet attained to an absolutely perfect self-consciousness, as the baffled striving of the philosopher envinces" ⁶³. This state of humans may, more than any other fact, evidence an imperfect and ectypal personality from which we look to an archetypal. Augustine's entire development is that of a mind unhindered by finite concepts, and in which perfect knowledge of the eternal forms is acquired. Augustine locates such a mind theoretically in man as bearer of the imago dei , and actually in God as the subject of that image. The unhindered mind located in the imago dei , however, is not to be equated with the mind or Wisdom of God, for the human mind, even in its own state of perfection remains merely an image or reflection of the divine reality. Nor does Augustine assume that when the human mind "shall see Him as He is" (1 John 3:2) that our knowledge will be comparable to God's knowledge. "Not even then shall we be equal to Him in nature. For that nature which is made is ever less that which makes... the creature which was formed will indeed have been formed so that nothing will be wanting of that form to which it ought to attain; yet nevertheless it will not be equalled to that simplicity wherein there is not anything formable, which has been formed or re-formed, but only form; and which being neither formless nor formed, itself is eternal and unchangeable substance." (15.16)

It is clear that Augustine does not see the creature as attaining equality with the Creator regarding nature or knowledge. Neither, then, will the uni-personal self-consciousness of the human ever become as the archetypal tri-personal self-consciousness of the Godhead. This difference arises from our being creatures of composite nature, whose knowledge, no matter how perfect, forever remains distinct from our existence ⁶⁴. This inevitable distinction of existence and knowledge limits the quality of words begotten in humanity, such that our begotten words are incapable of being equated with existence. "Our knowledge is in most things capable of being lost and of being recovered, because to us to be is not the same as to know or to be wise; since it is possible for us to be, even although we know not, neither are wise in that which we have learned from elsewhere." ⁶⁵The simple nature of God, however, requires the equation of God's Existence and Wisdom, such that the perfect Word which is begotten by God must also possesses of itself Existence and Wisdom. Therefore, the determining necessary condition for the rise of self-consciousness within the divine Word and Love of God is clearly the simple nature which the Godhead alone possesses and alone could possibly possess. In this way, God alone is capable of possessing the archetypal tri-personal self-consciousness which is demonstrated in the Divine Trinity.

Only in the simple nature of the Godhead would self-consciousness of the divine Being bring about self-consciousness in the perfect knowledge of itself. On this Dorner writes, "The absolute energy of His Knowledge must also penetrate His own depths, and indeed in such a way that He does not merely think His thought, but His Being also and His Life." ⁶⁶And elsewhere, "In God...perfect Self-knowledge is possible, inasmuch as He really and objectively transfuses Himself into His Image. Further, to the fact that God is self-conscious truth or wisdom, the duality of thinker and thought is likewise inadequate; nor does it suffice that the Image, which is not merely a form of thought, but is real, be more than that which is merely thought or posited, namely, self-thinking and self-positing, and does not remain in mere passivity." ⁶⁷In order for God to fully know Himself, He must place all of Himself in the Image whereby He sees Himself, and this "all" must include Essence and existence, if God is to know these things of Himself. In this way, the Self-consciousness of the second Person of the Trinity, the Word of God may be reasonably accounted for.

"The Word of God, then, the only begotten Son of the Father, in all things like and equal to the Father, God of God, Light of Light, Wisdom of Wisdom, Essence of Essence, is altogether that which the Father is, yet is not the Father, because the one is Son [begotten], the other is Father [begetter]. And hence, He knows all that the Father knows; but to Him to know, as to be, is from the Father, for to know and to be is there one. And therefore as to be is not to the Father from the Son, so neither is to know. Accordingly, as though uttering Himself, the Father begat the Word equal to Himself in all things; for He would not have uttered Himself wholly and perfectly, if there were in His Word anything more or less than in Himself. ...Therefore God the Father knows all things in Himself, knows all things in the Son; but in Himself as though Himself, in the Son as though His own Word which Word is spoken concerning all those that are in Himself. Similarly the Son knows all things, viz., in Himself, as things which are born of those which the Father knows in Himself [i.e., the Son], and in the Father, as those of which the are born, which the Son Himself knows in Himself. The Father, then, and the Son know mutually; but the one by begetting, the other by being born. And each of them sees simultaneously all things that are in their knowledge, in their wisdom, in their essence." (15.14.23)

Thus, the Father and the Son, are both of the same substance and equal therein in all ways, while at the same time possessing between them the necessary relation of begetter/begotten, filiation. But we still are not able to arrive at divine Self-consciousness. The unity of the Godhead has now been distinguished into two distinctions, though without the Essence becoming divided. These distinctions are the Father as the contemplating Subject, and the Word as the contemplated Object. Shedd compares this stage of development with human self-consciousness: "We have not yet reached full self-consciousness. In order to complete self-conscious intuition, the finite spirit must, yet further, perceive that this subject-ego and object-ego, this contemplant and contemplated... are one and the same essence or being . ...If the mind never became aware that the object contemplated... is no other, as to essence, than the subject contemplating; it would not have self-knowledge at all. It would not perceive that it had been contemplating self ." ⁶⁸ A reflexive principle is required whereby the Subject is able to recognize the Object as Self. As we have seen, Augustine will locate this reflexive principle in the love which unites the mind and word. He develops the relation of love to the two distinctions most fully in his discussion of the memory, to which we now turn.

For Augustine, memory consists in the mind's embracing that word which it has begotten. As noted, the mind's desire accounts for the mind's begetting of a word, and as the word is begotten, that desire turns to a love which embraces the word. This love, then, proceeds from the mind, embraces the begotten word, and thereby unites the two. When this embrace relaxes, the mind turns to other thoughts which are themselves then subjected to the mind's love. Remembrance occurs when the mind embraces a preformed word which had hitherto been neglected. Augustine writes, "The gaze of our thought does not return to anything except by remembering it, and does not care to return unless by loving it: so love, which combines the vision brought about in the memory, and the vision of the thought formed thereby, as if parent and offspring, would not know what to love rightly unless it had a knowledge of what it desired, which it cannot have without memory and understanding." ⁶⁹Human knowledge is finite in both its capacity to form perfect words, and in its ability to continually hold a particular word in the mind's attention. The mind's finitude accounts for the human phenomenon of remembering and forgetting, even of those thoughts which are deemed valuable by the individual.

Augustine extends this the triunity of memory (i.e., knowledge being embraced by the mind), understanding (i.e., the word) and love to the divine Trinity wherein we find perfect knowledge and perfect love. Having already established the relational process whereby the Word is begotten by the Father, he points out that the Father's retention or conscious knowledge of the Word is likewise perfect and eternal, such that the Word is eternally and fully held in the mind of the Father. The Word is therefore never forgotten nor in need of recollection at any time. Based on the analogous process in humanity, we see that this is possible only through a perfect Love or Will proceeding from the Father. This perfect Love embraces the Word as the perfect Object of itself, since both Word and Love are fully and perfectly of the Father. The Word likewise, as a perfect Image of the Father containing within itself all that is in the Father, will have this perfect Love, not only for itself as the begotten Word of the Father, but also for the Father as the source of its being begotten. In this sense, the Love of God likewise must proceed from the Word, if indeed the Word is to be a perfect likeness of the Father. The divine Love is that which binds the Father and the Word, not in opposition to the will of either, but in perfect accord with the divine Will, for this Love is in fact to be understood as the divine Will ⁷⁰ .

This Love proceeds from the Father principally, as the source of both Word and Love ⁷¹, yet also proceeds from the Son, as the Image of the Father. The begetting of the Word involves the presence of the divine Love, and yet the divine Love is complete only when both Father and Word possess a perfect love for each other. This triune relationship of the Godhead is present from eternity, and never was there a time in which it had not yet been ⁷². But the question remains how self-consciousness may be ascribed to this divine Love, for whereas the Word is found Self-conscious through its complete resemblance of the Father, divine Love is neither said to be an image nor resemblance of the Father. Again, we turn to the simple nature for insight. The scriptural witness points us in the right direction in its claim that "God is love" (1 John 4:16). This is not to be understood as if God merely possesses love, for in the simple nature, all attributes are equated with the Essence. This, then, is a statement equating God with divine Love. Augustine writes, "That in that simple and highest nature, substance should not be one thing and love another, but that substance itself should be love, whether in the Father, or in the Son, or in the Holy Spirit; and yet that the Holy Spirit should be specially called Love." ⁷³The divine Love, of the same substance of the Father, proceeds from the Father and embraces fully the Word as the Image of the Father. It is through the divine Love's unifying the Father and Son that Self-consciousness is completed in the Godhead. Within the simple nature of the Godhead, these three, Father, Son, and divine Love are of the same substance. And as the Father pours into the Word the entirety of Himself, so also now, flowing through the divine Love is both the Essence and Mind ⁷⁴of the Father, and the Essence and Mind of the Word. And whereas these Essences are all one and the same, being shared by the three, we must attribute Self-consciousness to that divine Love wherein the divine Self-consciousness is fulfilled. And herein lies the designation of that Love as Spirit, for indeed it is a Living and Knowing Spirit, full of the Knowledge of Father and Son, uniting the two, in complete accord with the divine Will found within each Person.

It is clear that, given the uniquely simple nature of the Godhead, there exists no possibility of any truly similar trinity arising. For this trinity is both Unity and Tri-Personality, with both of these in perfect harmony, each allowing the total fulfillment of the other. For to Unity must be ascribed even the seemingly personal attributes of Wisdom, Knowledge and Love. And to the Trinity must be ascribed an unparalleled fullness of each Person of the Trinity, such that each is separate yet conjoined through a sharing of a unified divine Essence. The divine Unity, then, is necessarily a Trinity. And the Trinity is necessarily a Unity. It has been clearly demonstrated how the entire question of tri-personality depends upon the simple nature, without which neither Word nor Love would deserve the designation Person. This simple nature is so radically different from anything within the physical universe, that we ought to approach any attempt to comprehend it with fear and respect. We cannot understand the Trinity in such manner whereby we imagine that the Father knows Himself through the Image, or that the Image know Himself through the Father's Knowledge of Him. Rather we must ascribe full Personality and Full Self-consciousness to each Person such that each is equally attributed with Wisdom, Knowledge, Love, etc.. It is indeed a stretch of the mind to grapple with the simple nature and its necessary tri-personal Self-consciousness. But Augustine has led us through a noble course through which the profound becomes slightly more visible.